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Preface

The primary concern of economists in the area of corporate
mergers has been potential anti-competitive effects. Little systematic research has been devoted to local economic impacts of corporate acquisitions. The probable reasons for this research vacuum
are twofold. First, economists have long recognized that short run
dislocations are a necessary by-product of a well-functioning market
economy. Second, the conventional economic wisdom has tacitly
assumed that acquisitions of local firms by large national corporations typically result in increased employment and payroll in the
community of the acquired firm.
This study indicates clearly that local economic impacts of corporate mergers deserve greater attention. The Nebraska data refute
the conventional wisdom and reveal that acquisitions have resulted
in an outflow of employment opportunities and corporate control
from Nebraska. Similar outflow is common to other sparsely populated states. In the light of an expressed national desire to halt the
unprecedented movement of population to metropolitan areas,
adverse local impacts of corporate acquisitions assume a national
social and economic significance.
This monograph is a result of a year of research undertaken to
complete a doctoral dissertation at the University of Nebraska. I
am indebted to several individuals for the help which they rendered.
First and foremost, I would like to publicly thank my wife Terri,
who key punched computer cards, performed numerous calculations, and typed the various manuscripts.
Since most of the data were collected from the Nebraska Labor
Department, Division of Employment, lowe a large debt to several
individuals in this Division. I especially wish to thank Les Johnson
for his cooperation and aid. The study would not have been possible
without his generous assistance.
I also wish to thank Professors Campbell R. McConnell and
John R. Felton of the Department of Economics, University of
Nebraska - Lincoln, for their valuable suggestions and encouragement. Finally, I am indebted to the University of Nebraska - Lincoln Bureau of Business Research for aid during the early stages
of the project.

I / Introduction

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
CORPORATE ~ERGERS

A considerable amount of time and research effort has been
devoted to the analysis of the effects of corporate mergers upon
industrial concentration. 1 Likewise, much research has been undertaken with respect to the relationship between economic concentration and market performance. Indeed, the primary economic concern associated with mergers and acquisitions is the possible anticompetitive effects which may accompany them. Thus, the Federal
Trade Commission staff has pointed out: "The major public policy
concern arising from mergers is that they have the effect of entrenching or creating market power, thereby rendering competition
ineffective as a regulatory mechanism."2
Although the anti-competitive potential associated with mergers
must remain the primary focus of economic research in the merger
area, there exists an equally important need to assess secondary
economic impacts of corporate marriages. In light of the phenomenal increase in mergers during the past decade and the fact
that the recent merger wave is increasingly of a conglomerate nature, these "secondary" economic effects, in fact, may push their
way to the forefront of policy concern. In particular, the local economic impacts of corporate acquisitions require careful appraisal.
Also, the directional flow of corporate control and its accompanying
geographic concentration should be of interest to researchers and
policy makers.
THE RESEARCH VACUUM

Dr. Willard ~ueller, former director of the Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, pointed out to a Senate subcommittee in November 1969 that:
Little systematic research has been conducted on the impact of mergers on local communities .... The most comprehensive study undertaken to date was conducted by the
Bureau of Business Research and Service of the University
of Wisconsin for the Governor of the State of Wisconsin. 3
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It is this research vacuum, along with severe methodological
weaknesses of the Wisconsin study, * which has led the author to
undertake the empirical and analytical study which follows.
PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

This analysis will provide at least partial answers to the following questions:
1. To what extent have Nebraska firms been involved in the
current merger wave? What has been the nature and scope
of this Nebraska involvement? How do Nebraska merger
characteristics, i.e., size of firm, type of merger, industry of
the acquired firm, compare with those of the United States
as a whole?
2. What were the primary and secondary motives associated
with the Nebraska acquisitions? What institutional factors
have served to encourage merger activity?
3. How did the pre-merger employment and payroll growth
rates of the acquired firms compare to non-acquired firms
in the same industry?
4. What were the local employment and payroll impacts of
the mergers?
5. ''\That was the geographical pattern of the transfer of control? To what extent did changes in sources of supply and
locational changes in the use of financial institutions result
from the acquisition?
This research clearly transcends the Wisconsin study both in
scope and in empirical substance. The Wisconsin study relied
heavily on questionnaires as a means of assessing the impact of the
Wisconsin mergers. In attempting to ascertain employment and
payroll effects, the Wisconsin effort compared pre-merger growth
rates to post-merger rates. As will be pointed out in Chapter IV,
this method of comparison failed to isolate the merger effect. The
present study, using correlated tests for matched-pairs, compared
pre- and post-merger rates of acquired firms with the pre- and postmerger rates of hypothetical average firms within their 2-digit industries. Furthermore, aggregate employment and payroll impacts of
the corporate mergers were estimated.
This study also transcends the Wisconsin study in that it traces
the geographical flow of corporate control which resulted from the
acquisition of the Nebraska firms. In addition, the acquired Ne* These weaknesses will be described in Chapter IV.
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braska firms were classified and analyzed by type of merger, 4-digit
industry, and employment size. These classifications allowed a direct
comparison of the Nebraska merger movement with the recent
United States merger experience.
It should be pointed out, however, that the Wisconsin study
examined an important local impact which this study did not,
namely, the effect of mergers on contributions to community causes.
Therefore, this Nebraska study expands and complements the ",\Visconsin research. The two studies, taken together, serve as a research
beginning in the important area of state and local economic impacts of corporate mergers.
THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM

Specifically, this research attempts to test systematically the general validity of the conventional wisdom that firms which are
acquired by other corporations are typically dying enterprises and
that the merger brings with it an infusion of new and progressive
management along with expanded financial resources. The result,
so this argument goes, is growth of the acquired operation. This
expansion includes greater employment and payrolls and, therefore,
additional local spending, tax collections, and so forth. Thus, the
real winner is the total community.
If, by chance, the acquired corporation was a financially successful one showing vigorous growth, then the merger would, in the
view of the conventional wisdom, serve to accentuate this growth.
In a statement introduced into official Senate hearing records by
Senator Roman Hruska of Nebraska, Ira G. Corn, Jr., Senior Executive Officer of the Michigan General Corporation, stated:
Assume the example of a privately-held company recently
acquired as a marginal operation with turnabout potential.
Ownership of such a corporation by a conglomerate has a
great beneficial impact. Added capital creates both a greater
challenge and job security for management and manpower.
Customers are better served with better products. Suppliers
enjoy increased business. Efficient facilities are developed,
lower production costs are achieved, and greater profit margins are attained. Higher Federal, State, and local taxes are
paid.
Assume the example of an acqulSltlOn of a highly successful, privately-held firm. It is likely to have its momentum
accelerated under conglomerate management . . . . 4
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Nor is the conventional wisdom confined solely to corporate
executives. Donald F. Dewey has stated that the majority of mergers " ... are merely a civilized alternative to bankruptcy, or the
voluntary liquidation that transfers assets from failing to rising
firms."5
Henry Manne, in a sense, has theoretically formalized and rationalized the conventional wisdom. G According to Manne, the
separation of ownership and control of American enterprise, in
conjunction with inadequate product market competition, results
in a general business environment which allows professional managers to operate their concerns inefficiently. The possibility of a
takeover via acquisition, however, performs a function which assures
an efficient allocation of resources. This possibility serves as a potential punishment for management which is not maximizing
profits.
vVhy is this the case? According to the Manne position, inefficient management and accompanying sluggish corporate growth
will serve to lower the price-earnings ratio of the corporation's
stock. Firms with low stock-earnings ratios are prime targets for
takeover. * It will thus be slow-growing firms dominated by ineffective management which will be ripe for acquisition. The truly wellmanaged corporation will not likely become the object of an
acquisition attempt.
It is clear that Manne's position, though more sophisticated,
leads to conclusions similar to those expressed by Mr. Corn. Acquisitions, on the average, are likely to involve slow-growing firms.
Upon acquisition these enterprises, on the average, will have
increased profits and corporate growth rates.
TYPES OF .MERGER ARRANGEMENTS

Before proceeding to an examination of the merger movements
in Nebraska and the United States, it is necessary to establish a
definitional framework. Mergers may be of several forms and types.
Broadly speaking, a merger is said to occur: "VVhenever one
company acquires, assumes, or otherwise gains control over the
assets of another company by an exchange of assets or equity seCluities, or when two companies combine to form a brand new enterprise."7
Mergers may be of two basic forms: acquisitions or consolidations. s An acquisition occurs when the acquiring firm retains its
identity. The acquired concern may also retain its name as a sub* The reason this is the case will be examined in Chapter III.
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sidiary of the larger corporation or it may undergo a complete
identity change. A consolidation occurs when two or more corporations are combined into a new identity. The large majority of
mergers involving Nebraska firms, 1964-1968, were acquisitions
rather than consolidations.
Distinguishing between types of mergers is a more difficult task
than determining their forms. Scholars have employed various
categorizations of mergers by type. For the sake of providing a
basis for comparing Nebraska data to United States merger data,
the author has utilized standard Federal Trade Commission merger
definitions in classifying Nebraska mergers. *
Basically mergers are of three distinct types: horizontal, vertical,
or conglomerate. Horizontal mergers are those which involve firms
which produce closely related products and sell these products in
the same geographic market. An example of this type of merger
is the acquisition of Nixon and Company, a livestock feed producer,
Omaha, by Nebraska Consolidated Mills, also of Omaha. This horizontal combination was consummated in 1966.
Vertical mergers are those in which the firms involved have a
buyer-seller relationship. These mergers, therefore, may be either
"forward" or "backward" depending upon whether the acquiring
firm purchases a firm which buys its product or one which supplies
raw materials or components. An example of a forward vertical
acquisition would be the 1968 purchase of Pioneer Glass and Paint
Co., Omaha, a paint wholesaler, by Benjamin Moore Corp. of New
York, a paint producer. On the other hand, the acquisition of Craft
Guild Products of Omaha by Josten's Inc., Minnesota, in 1968, is
an example of a backward vertical merger. Josten's Inc., produces
trophies while Craft Guild builds trophy bases.
The third type of merger is the conglomerate combination.
These mergers may be subdivided into three types. Conglomerate
mergers of the geographic market extension variety are characterized
by mergers which involve firms which produce the same product
* Some observers have concluded that the I<"rc definitions of conglomerate
mergers are too inclusive. All mergers which do not specifically fit the horizontal
and vertical categories are classified as some type of a conglomerate. As a result,
it is argued that the FTC data greatly m"gnify the actual conglomerate nature
of the current merger movement. See in particular Samuel R. Reid, "Conglomerate Growth: Consistency with Economic Theory of Grmnh," in Economics of
Conglomerate Growth, Leon Garoian, ed. (Corvallis, Oregon: Oregon State University, 1969) pp. 44, 45. The author, though sympathizing with this contention,
has nevertheless concluded that the advantages associated with using the FTC
definitions far outweig'h any misconceptions which might arise from their use,
Comparisons of the Nebraska and overall merger movements require a common
set of defini tions,
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or service but sell them in different geographic markets. An example
of this type of conglomerate acquisition would be the acquisition of
Center Bank, Omaha, by Northwest Bank Corporation, Minneapolis, in 1965.
A conglomerate merger may be of a product extension type. Such
mergers involve firms which are related in production and/or
distribution but whose products do not directly compete with one
another. The 1967 merger between Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Ogallala Electronics Manufacturing, Ogallala, was of the product extension type. Imperial
Eastman Corporation's 1967 takeover of Brunning Co., Lincoln,
was also of this basic conglomerate type.
A final category of conglomerate mergers may be called pure
conglomerates. Those mergers involve totally unrelated diversification. No functional or buyer-seller relationship exists. The acquisitions of the Sun Newspaper of Omaha and the National Indemnity Co., Omaha, by Berkshire Hathaway, New Bedford, Massachusetts, were of the pure conglomerate type. Likewise, the 1966 purchase of Nebraska Crib and Silo Co., Fremont by Fugua Industries,
Atlanta, Georgia, was a pure conglomerate acquisition.
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

In the following chapter the magnitude, scope, and nature of
the recent Nebraska merger movement are compared and contrasted
with the United States experience. Nebraska mergers are classified
by type of merger, industry of the acquired firm, and employment
size. In Chapter III, factors encouraging mergers are explored.
Questionnaire responses are utilized as a beginning point for an
analysis of merger motives of both acquired and acquiring firms.
Chapters IV and V deal with local economic impacts of corporate mergers. In the former, results of statistical tests employing
pre- and post-merger employment and payroll growth rates are
reported and analyzed. In addition, aggregate employment and payroll effects are estimated. In Chapter IV, the directional flow of
corporate control resulting from Nebraska acquisitions is traced.
Possible adverse local economic effects are examined. In the final
chapter, policy implications of the research findings are explored.

II/The Magnitude, Scope, and Nature of the
Recent Merger Movements Within the
United States and Nebraska

THE NATIONAL MERGER EXPERIENCE
The industrial organization of American enterprise has undergone two major merger movements and is currently in the midst of
a third. Each period of intense merger activity has served to alter
the basic structure of American enterprise.
The first major merger movement in the United States began
about 1895 and lasted midway into the first decade of the new century. The basic outcome of this movement was the successful
achievement of greater market concentration. This wave of merger
activity was dominated by several large horizontal and vertical
mergers within the steel, tin, tobacco, copper, and farm machinery
industries.
Such industrial giants as United States Steel, duPont, International Telephone and Telegraph, and American Tobacco trace their
origins to mergers consummated during this 1895-1905 period.
Ralph L. Nelson, a prominent scholar of American merger
movements, has concluded that the first merger wave transformed
industries characterized by many medium and small-sized firms
" ... into those in which one or a few very large enterprises occupied leading positions. It laid the foundation for the industrial
structure that has characterized most of American industry in the
twentieth century."l
The second major wave of merger activity occurred in the
1930's. This movement, like its predecessor, was composed primarily
of horizontal and vertical mergers initiated by investment bankers.
Much of the industrial concentration achieved in the initial movement had become diluted by the entry of new firms. Thus, the
second merger movement was characterized by an attempt to reclaim market power. 2 In addition, the second movement witnessed
several mergers and acquisitions designed to establish concentration
in new and emerging industries.

7
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Though primarily horizontal in nature, some conglomerate
mergers of the geographic market extension type did occur during
the second movement. These took place mainly within the dairy and
food retailing industries.
During the 1921-1933 period, nearly $13 billion of assets were
acquired. These $13 billion of assets amounted to a cumulative
17.49 percent of the total manufacturing and mining assets in the
United States. 3 The second wave of merger activity peaked in 1929.
This wave was not effectively restrained by Section 7 of the Clayton
Act. In fact, Supreme Court decisions between 1926 and 1934
served to render Section 7 useless as a governmental anti-merger
weapon. 4
THE SCOPE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE CURRENT MERGER MOVEMENT

The contemporary merger wave began during World War II.
It may be divided into two parts, 1943-1947 and 1950 to the present.
The early portion of the current movement brought forth increases
in concentration in the textile, alcoholic beverage, paper, and
cement industries, while the later 20-year experience has produced
the widespread dominance of the conglomerate industrial structure.
The current merger experience has been the longest in duration of
the three major American movements; it has also been the largest
in terms of the number of firms involved.
Figure 2-1 compares manufacturing and mining acquisitions
during each of the three major merger periods. Only large acquisitions (over $10 million in assets) are recorded.
During the 1950-1968 period, 15,096 mergers took place, and
over 600 occurred each year since 1965. In fact, 5,941 acquisitions
took place in the four-year period, 1965-1968. As seen in Figure 2-1,
2,444 mergers were consummated in 1968 alone. The fact that 39.35
percent of all mergers occurring during the 18-year period did so
in the last four years, 1965-1968, clearly shows the recent monumental growth of merger activity in the United States.
Figure 2-1 understates total merger activity since it includes
only manufacturing and mining mergers. The number of acquisitions within the trade and service industries has also increased
sharply in recent years, particularly in 1968. The growth of mergers
in trade and services is documented in Table 2-1.
The magnitude of the current merger movement may also be
measured with respect to the total volume of assets acquired. Table
2-2 clearly establishes the fact that the value of acquired assets has
increased drastically during the 1965-1968 period. Once again,
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only mmmg and manufacturing firms are included. Table 2-2,
unlike Table 2-1, however, includes estimates of assets of small firms
(under $10 million asset size).5

FIGURE 2-1
THREE MERGER MOVEMENTS COMPARED, MANUFACTURING AND
MINING ACQUISITIONS
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SOURCE: FTC Staff Merger RelJort, 1969, Figure 1-1, p. 32
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Figure 2-2 depicts Table 2-2 graphically and also shows the
relationship of acquired assets to the number of firms acquired.
The growth of mergers within the trade and service industries
(Table 2-2) is also illustrated.
If one compares the assets of acquired firms with total new
investment within manufacturing and mining, the magnitude of
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2-1

TABLE

MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN TRADE AND
SERVICES,

Year

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
Total
SOURCE:

1960-1968

Wholesale and
Retail Trade

Services

127
255
235
186
207
191
188
232
452
1,893

123
220
236
155
247
312
223
310
696
2,525

Total

250
475
471
344
454
503
411
542
1,148
4,418

Adapted by author from FTC Staff Merger Report, 1969. Appendix Table 1·14,

p.679.

the current wave is seen in yet an additional aspect. In 1960, the
acquire assets were $2.3 billion; in 1968, $15.2 billion. As a percentage of total new investment, acquired assets increased from 15.0
percent in 1960 to 54.6 percent in 1968. Table 2-3 shows these
relationships.
It should be obvious from Table 2-3 that a growing percentage
of available expansion funds are being used to purchase existing
assets, while a diminishing percentage is being utilized to purchase
new capital. It is, of course, only the latter which adds to total economic capacity. The 1967-68 period is particularly interesting. New
capital expenditures failed to increase during these two years while
the volume of assets acquired increased sharply.
2-2

TABLE

TOTAL ASSETS OF MANUFACTURING AND MINING
FIRMS ACQUIRED,

Year

Assets
(Millions)

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

$2,326
2,630
2,990
3,947
3,670

Total
SOURCE:

1960-1968

Year

Assets
(Millions)

1965
1966
1967
1968

$ 4,914
5,416
10,81.5
15,200

$51,908
Adapted by author from FTC Merger Report, 1969. Appendix Table [·3, p. 667.

Before proceeding to an examination of the merger experience
within Nebraska, several additional facts concerning the scope and
magnitude of the current merger movement might be mentioned.
All of the following points were gleaned from the comprehensive
1969 Federal Trade Commission staff report on corporate mergers: G
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1. Only six corporations with assets of $250 million or more
were acquired during the entire 1948-1966 period. Six such
corporations were acquired in 1967; 12, in 1968.
2. Nearly all of the acquired corporations with $25 million or
more assets were profitable in the year prior to the merger.
3. Sixty-three percent of all firms in the $10-25 million asset
size class were acquired sometime during the 1948-1968
period.

FIGURE 2:-2
NUMBER AND TOTAL ASSETS OF MANUFACTURING AND MINING FIRMS
ACQUIRED AND

NUMBER OF TRADE AND

SERVICE

1960-1968
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SOURCE: Compiled by author from FTC Staff Merger Report, 1969, Appendix Tal,1es I-I,
1-3, and 1-14.
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4. In 1959 there were 883 firms of $25 million· plus asset size.
If the number of such firms had grown at the same rate
relative to total manufacturing assets as they did between
1949 and 1959, 2,209 such firms would have existed in 1969.
Instead, there were 1,354 firms in this size class in that year.
Merger activity accounts for most of the difference.
5. A total of 327 corporations ranked among the largest 1,000
manufacturing companies of 1950 had been acquired by 1968.
TABLE 2-3
ACQUIRED ASSETS COMPARED WITH NEW INVESTMENT IN
MANUFACTURING AND MINING, 1960-1968
(Billions of Dollars)

Year

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
Total

;\lew
Investment"

Total
Assets Acquired

$ 15.47

$ 2.326

14.66
15.76
16.73
19.77
23.75
28.46
28.11
27.86
$190.57

2.630
2.990
3.947
3.670
4.914
5.416
10.815
15.200
--$51.908

Acquired Assets
as Percentage of
New Investment

15.0%
17.9
19.0
23.6
18.6
20.7
19.0
38.5
54.6
27.2%

a As reported in Economic Report of the President, 1969, p. 271.
SOURCE: Adapted by author from FTC Staff Merger RellOrt, 1969, Appendix Table 1·4,
p. 668.

THE NATURE OF RECENT INDUSTRIAL COMllINATION:
THE TYPE OF MERGER
The nature of the corporate merger movement has changed
remarkably during the 1948-1968 period. The current merger
movement has increasingly become a conglomerate phenomenon.
It is obvious from Figure 2-3 that while horizontal mergers, in terms
of acquired assets, declined relatively, conglomerate-type acquisitions increased from 37.5 percent of the 1948-1951 total to 88.5
percent of the assets acquired in 1968. Vertical mergers also declined relatively during the 20-year period.
Another facet of the changing nature of corporate mergers is
evident. Pure conglomerate mergers-those in which unrelated diversification occurred-increased from zero percent of total conglomerate acquired assets at the beginning of the period to 43.6 percent
of such assets in 1968. Thus two definite patterns have evidenced
themselves:
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1. Horizontal and vertical mergers have declined relative to
conglomerate mergers.
2. Pure conglomerate mergers have increased relative to other
types of conglomerate combinations.

FIGURE 2-3
DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS ACQUIRED IN LARGE MERGERS.
BY TYPE,
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THE NATURE OF RECENT INDUSTRIAL COMBINATION:
THE INDUSTRY OF THE ACQUIRED FIRM
Unfortunately, national data on mergers by industry of the acquired firm do not exist. Such a disaggregation of Nebraska mergers
will be presented later. Several facts, however, are clear from the
national data which are available.
As noted earlier, merger activity in the trade and service industries increased more rapidly than in manufacturing and mining,
1960-1968. Likewise, the holding company has achieved new vitality.7 Given the movement toward unrelated diversification, nonmanufacturing corporations have increasingly been acquired by
manufacturing entities and vice versa.
In general, it may be concluded that the current upswing in
merger activity has affected nearly all industries in the United
States. The recent movement has not been confined to a relatively
limited number of industries as in the earlier merger waves. The
Nebraska data, gathered by the author, confirm this general conclusion.
THE NEBRASKA MERGER EXPERIENCE
THE IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM
Owing to the extreme difficulty of identifying Nebraska firms
which were involved in merger activity, only a five-year period,
1964-1968, was utilized as a basis for the analysis which follows.
No single agency or organization had a complete listing of Nebraska
mergers, but several bodies had a partial listing of acqmsItIons
which in some manner fell under their jurisdiction or scope of
concern.
Briefly, the Nebraska mergers were identified in the following
manner:
1. National Industrial Conference Board monthly A nnouncements of Mergers and Acquisitions were scrutinized over the
five-year period. This process yielded several large mergers
involving Nebraska-based firms. The Conference Board listing includes only large acquisitions.
2. Financial journals such as Standard and Poor's and Moody's
were used to attempt to trace specific acquisitions.
3. The Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, provided a partial list of Nebraska firms acquired by the 200
largest manufacturing corporations in the United States.
Much of the FTC data was compiled from confidential
sources and could not be released.
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4. Approximately 75 questionnaires were sent to Chamber of
Commerce officials and bank presidents throughout the state
seeking their help in identifying mergers involving firms in
their localities. Responses to the questionnaire yielded a substantial number of mergers.
5. A tedious search through data made available by the Research and Statistics Division, Division of Employment and
Wages, Nebraska State Labor Department, was undertaken.
The Employment and ''''age Division records all formal
changes in business ownership in conjunction with its administration of the Unemployment Compensation program. Of
course, most of the changes of ownership which occurred
during the five-year period under review were not mergers.
This is to say, they simply involved the selling of a business
to another individual, the inclusion of a new partner, or the
incorporation of the enterprise. Therefore, the true mergers
or acquisitions had to be distilled from the numerous changes
of ownership. Individual files on each firm were helpful in
this regard.
Though each of the above methods contributed to the establishment of the Nebraska merger list, the last proved to be the most
helpful. Some mergers, particularly those involving stock transactions, were not included. However, nearly all mergers involving two
Nebraska firms were identified through the Unemployment Compensation records.
Only mergers involving acquired Nebraska-based companies
were included in the Nebraska list. If, for example, an out-of-state
based corporation had operations in Nebraska, and this out-ofstate corporation was then acquired, the change of ownership of
the Nebraska operations was not included in the Nebraska merger
list. Thus, for example, although North American Van Lines had
business establishments in Nebraska and was purchased by Pepsi
Co., Inc., in 1968, the change of control of the Nebraska establishments was not considered to be a Nebraska merger.
The Nebraska merger list which was compiled also excluded
mergers in which Nebraska-based corporations purchased out-ofstate businesses. It will be demonstrated later that only a small
number of Nebraska corporations have been active acquirers of
out-of-state firms.
The identification procedure was very time consuming. Nevertheless, the methods utilized allowed for cross checking and, therefore, yielded a rather comprehensive sample of Nebraska merger
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activity, 1964-1968. A total of 149 acqmsltlons were identified. It
is probable that nearly all acquisitions of large Nebraska firms were
included and that a large percentage of all acquisitions of firms
with more than ten employees were represented. A partial listing
of these mergers is printed in the Appendix. Many of the 149
acquisitions were obtained through confidential records and, therefore, are not included in this listing.
THE MAGNITUDE OF THE NEBRASKA MERGER EXPERIENCE

In many respects the Nebraska merger experience during the
period 1964-1968 broadly mirrored that of the overall national
movement.
In Table 2-4 and Figure 2-4, the 149 mergers are divided into
two groups. One group includes all mergers in which a Nebraska
firm was acquired by an out-of-state corporation; the other, mergers
or acquisitions involving Nebraska firms only. Hereafter, the former
mergers will be referred to as Nebraska-Outstate; the latter, Nebraska-Nebraska.
A steady increase in merger activity is evident throughout the
five-year period. It is clear, in particular, that there has been a
sharp upswing in merger activity involving the acquisition of Nebraska firms by outstate corporations. On the other hand, the number of Nebraska-Nebraska mergers has remained quite constant
during the last four years of the period.
Over 33 percent of the Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions occurred
in 1968, and nearly 60 percent took place in either 1967 or 1968.
Overall, 55.03 percent of the mergers occurred in 1967 and 1968
while only 22.82 percent were consummated in the first two years
of the study. This trend, though not directly comparable to the
national data, * is reflective of the national merger experience as
shown in Figure 2-1 and Table 2-1.
THE SIZE OF NEBRASKA ACQUIRED FIRMS

Asset data on each firm was not recorded. However, it will be
seen later in this chapter that the Nebraska-Nebraska mergers
largely involved relatively small firms while the opposite was the
case with respect to the outs tate mergers. Therefore, in terms of
acquired assets, the increase in the magnitude of the Nebraska
merger movement, 1964-1968, more closely approximates the Nebraska-Outstate trend line in Figure 2-4 than it does the total trend
line.
* The national data include only large acqnisitions, i.e., those with assets
of $10 million or more.
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TABLE 2-4
1964-1968

MERGERS INVOLVING NEBRASKA FIRMS,

Year

Nebraska-Outstate

1968
1967
1966
1965
1964

Nebraska-Nebraska

28
21
16
9
9
83
55.70

Total
Percent of Total

I

Total

44
38
33
25
9
149
100.00

16
17
17
16
0
66
44.30

FIGURE 2-4
1964-1968
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During the 1955-1968 period, Nebraska firms with assets of over
$129 million were acquired by members of the 200 largest United
States manufacturing firms alone. Table 2-5 summarizes these acquisitions.
Table 2-6 indicates the employment size range of Nebraska firms
which were acquired by corporations located outside of the state.
Thirty-eight percent of the firms acquired are considered "small"
firms in that they had fewer than 25 employees at the time of acquisition. Another 38 percent fall into the medium-sized category, and
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TABLE 2-5
PUBLICLY HELD COMPANIES IN NEBRASKA ACQUIRED BY MEMBERS OF
THE 1968 200 LARGEST MANUFACTURING FIRMS, 1955-1968 a

Year of
Acquisition

Name of
Acquiring Co.

1955
1955

Campbell Soup Co.
Consolidated Foods

1956

Fruehauf Corp.

1956

Proctor and
Gamble Co.
Martin -Marietta
Corp.
TRW, Inc.

1957
1960
1961

1964

National Distillers
and Chemical
Standard Oil Co.
of Indiana
Mobil Oil Corp.

1964
1965

Rohm and Haas Co.
Avco Corp.

1961

Total

Name of
Acquired Co.
C. A. Swanson and Sons
Ocoma Foods Co. (Omaha
Cold Storage Co.)
Independent Metal
Prods. Co.
Nebraska Consolidated Mills
Co. of Omaha (Division)
Platte Valley Cement
Good-All Electric
Manufacturing Co.
Farm Fertilizers, Inc.
Imperial Casualty and
Indemnity Co.
Northern Natural Gas
Producing
Grain Belt Supply Co.
Iowa Finance Co.

Value
in Year
Prior to
Acquisition
(Millions)

$ 25.1

4.3

1.3
3.2
0.7
6.4
78.0
0.6
16.0
$129.2

This is only a partial list since some of the acquisitions in this category were taken
from confidential sources.
SOURCE: Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
a

24 percent are classified as "large" firms by virtue of employing
over 100 workers.
It should be pointed out that the average Nebraska firm (subject to unemployment compensation) had only 20 employees in
1968. Therefore, most of the firms acquired by outstate corporations
were larger than the typical Nebraska firm. In fact, 39 of a sample
of 54 Nebraska-Outstate mergers had more employees at the time
of acquisition than the average number of employees per firm
within the SIC 2-digit classification of their respective industry.
Firms acquired by other Nebraska firms were, on the average,
smaller in terms of employment than firms purchased by corporations residing outside of the state. In fact, the Nebraska-Nebraska
mergers tended to be of two basic types. Either relatively small N ebraska firms merged or large Nebraska firms acquired medium-sized
or small ones. Over 83 percent of the firms acquired by other N ebraska firms were small, i.e., they had fewer than 25 employees.
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TABLE 2-6
NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE

ACQUISITIONS,

1964-1968,

SIZE

CATEGORY

OF

ACQUIRED FIRM AT TIME OF ACQUISITION"

Employment
Size Category
Fewer than 25
25-100
101-200
201-500
Over 500
a

1964
4
2
I
0
2

1965

1966

1967

1968

Total

5
4
0
0
0

4
9
3
0
0

8
'I
2
2
0

9
8
5
3

30
30

I

II

5
3
79

FOllr of the 85 firms are excluded owing to a lack of employment data.

Table 2-7 indicates the size pattern of Nebraska-Nebraska acquisitions. Figure 2-5 compares mergers as to the percentage of total
acquisitions within each size category.
THE NATURE OF RECENT NEBRASKA MERGERS: THE TYPE OF MERGER

As noted earlier, the recent national merger movement has been
characterized by a remarkable shift toward conglomerate mergers.
Conglomerate mergers composed 79.8 percent of assets acquired in
large manufacturing and mining mergers during the 1964-1967
period, and 88.5 percent of such assets in 1968.
The predominance of conglomerate mergers may also be seen
in the Nebraska data, particularly in connection with NebraskaOutstate mergers. * Table 2-8 describes the Nebraska experience,
1964-1968, by type of merger; Figure 2-6 depicts each type of merger
as a percentage of all mergers.
As indicated in Figure 2-6, nearly 70 percent of all N ebraskaOutstate mergers were of the conglomerate type, while only 51.56
percent of the instate mergers were of this variety. It would appear
from Table 2-8 that a large majority of the Nebraska-Nebraska
acquisitions were of the horizontal or quasi-horizontal variety in
that 40.9 percent were horizontal and another 39.3 percent were
geographic market extension. The fact that the Nebraska-Nebraska
mergers generally involved small localized firms, of course, explains
the predominance of horizontal-type mergers. The Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions, on the other hand, involved, for the most part,
larger firms and, therefore, tended to conform more closely to the
national percentages by merger type.
* l\'ebraska mergers were classified on the basis of National Industrial Conference Board information, 4·digit SIC codes, and a direct questionnaire sent
to many of the firms involved.
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TABLE 2-7
NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA ACQUISITIONS, 1965-1968, SIZE CATEGORY OF
ACQUIRED FIRM AT TIME OF ACQUISITION a
Employment
Size Category
Fewer than 25
25-100
101-200
201-500
Over 500

1965

1966

1967

1968

Total

13
3
1
0
0

15
2
0
0
0

I4
0

54
8
3
0
0

12
3
0
0

I

0
0

65
a One of the 65 Nebraska-Nebraska acquisitions is excluded owing to a lack of employment data.

TABLE 2-8
NEBRASKA MERGERS, 1964-1968, BY TYPES OF COMBINATION
Type of
Merger
Horizontal
Vertical
All conglomerate
Geographic market
extension
Product extension
Pure conglomerate
Total

NebraskaOutstate

I NebraSka-I
Nebraska

Total

Percent
of Total

18
7
58

27
5
34

45
12
92

30.20%
8.05
61.74

34
15
9

26
6
2

60
21

40.27
14.09
7.38
100.00%

II

Fifty-three of the 92 conglomerate mergers occurred in 1967 and
1968, and nearly 84 percent of the Nebraska-Outstate conglomerate
mergers occurred in these two years. Thus it is clear that the Nebraska merger experience, as the broader movement of which it is
a part, is characterized by an increase in merger activity and a
relative increase in conglomerate combinations.
The movement away from horizontal and vertical mergers is at
least partially explained by the enactment and enforcement of the
Celler-Kefauver Amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act. This
so-termed "Anti-Merger Amendment" has seemingly failed to halt
the advance of the merger wave; rather it has served to change the
nature of the advance.
THE NATURE OF RECENT NEBRASKA MERGERS: THE INDUSTRY OF
THE ACQUIRED FIRM
The Nebraska mergers were classified by SIC 4-digit industry
codes. The 4-digit codes were recorded for both the acquiring and
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FIGURE 2-5
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acquired firms. Owing to the vast number of these 4-digit classifications, the acquired firms were sorted into 2-digit industry classifications. The 2-digit classifications, in turn, were combined into
broader industry categories.
Tables 2-9 and 2-10 reveal the broad industry categorization of
the acquired Nebraska firms. Several observations may be made on
the basis of these tables. First, it is clear that the industry patterns
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FIGURE 2-6
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in both the Nebraska-Nebraska and Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions
were nearly identical, except for the fact that there were four
instate acquisitions within the mining and construction industries
and no outs tate purchases within these areas. Manufacturing acquisitions accounted for 28.79 percent of the instate purchases and
33.73 percent of the Nebraska-Outstate mergers.
Second, the Nebraska data parallel the national merger experience in that there were more acquisitions of firms within the trade
and service industries than in manufacturing and mining. In fact,
in 1967 and 1968, there were 50 mergers involving trade and service
firms and only 22 acquisitions of mining and manufacturing con-
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cerns. This is understandable since Nebraska has far fewer firms
engaged in manufacturing than in selling goods and services. *
Within manufacturing, 21 of 47 Nebraska acquisitions, or 44.68
percent, involved SIC code 20 (Food Products) . Nationally, the food
product industry has been subject to a high degree of merger
activity.s
Thirdly, the Nebraska mergers reflect the broader trend in
another respect. Thirteen mergers involved firms engaged in finance,
insurance, or real estate. Several of these mergers were of the broad
holding-company type. For example, Northwest Bancorporation, a
bank holding company headquartered in Minneapolis, acquired
Center Bank of Omaha. Berkshire Hathaway of New Bedford,
Massachusetts, acquired the National Indemnity Co. and the National Fire and Marine Insurance Co., both of Omaha. Fidelity
Banker's Life of Richmond, Virginia, purchased Central National
Insurance Group of Omaha in 1968. Thus the recent national trend
toward large mergers within the finance and insurance industries is
reflected in the Nebraska experience, 1964-1968.
TABLE 2-9
BROAD INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATIONS OF NEBRASKA FIRMS ACQUIRED BY
OUTSTATE FIRMS,

Broad Industry
Manufacturing
Transportation, Communications and Utilities
Trade
Wholesale
Retail
Finance, Insurance, and
Real Estate
Services

1964-1968

Percent
11964119651196611967119681 Total 1 of Total
4

2

9

4

9

28

3
2
(I)
(I)

0
3
(2)
(I)

I
5
(4)
(I)

0
12
(6)
(6)

2
10
(5)
(5)

6
32
(18)
(14)

7.23
38.55

0
0

3
I

0

2
3

I
6

7
10

8.43
12.05

9

9

16

21

28

83

100.00%

33.73%

Finally, it might be noted that, although Nebraska retail trade
establishments outnumbered wholesale establishments 5,273 to 1,964
in 1968, acquisitions of wholesale establishments outnumbered
those of retail concerns 31 to 25 over the five-year period. t
.. In 1968, Nebraska had only 1,278 firms engaged in manufacturing while
it had 9,972 businesses providing goods and services (firms subject to unemployment compensation).
t Includes only firms subjected to unemployment compensation.
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TABLE 2-10

BROAD INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION OF NEBRASKA FIRMS ACQUIRED BY
OTHER NEBRASKA FIRMS,

Broad Industry
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation, Communications and Utilities
Trade
'Wholesale
Retail
Finance, Insurance, and
Real Estate
Services

1965

19661 1967

0
2

0
1
9

0
7

3
5
(4)
(I)

0
5
(3)
(2)

3
4
(2)
(2)

4
I
16

I

17

17

1965-1968
Percent
1968 1 Total I of Total
0

2
2
19

0
10
(4)
(6)

6
24
(13)
(II)

9.09
36.36

0

I

2

3
16

6
7
66

9.09
10.61
100.00%

3.03%
3.03
28.79

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The current merger movement in the United States is the longest in duration of the three major merger waves, and it has surpassed its predecessors in magnitude. The 1966-1968 portion of the
current wave, in particular, has been characterized by a tremendous
growth in both the number of mergers consummated and the volume of assets acquired. In addition, the nature of the recent wave
of merger activity has been distinct from the two which preceded
it. The recent merger scene has been dominated by conglomerate
mergers and has witnessed spectacular increases in merger activity
within the trade, services, finance, and insurance industries.
The Nebraska merger experience, 1964-1968, has been, in general, a reflection of the overall pattern. As many Nebraska firms
were purchased by outstate corporations during this period as were
acquired by other Nebraska concerns. Furthermore, the firms purchased by corporations residing outside of Nebraska tended to be
relatively large firms compared with the firms purchased by instate
companies and compared with the average-sized firm within their
respective 2-digit industries. Conglomerate combinations dominated
the Nebraska merger scene, particularly in those cases where Nebraska firms were acquired by out-of-state corporations.

III/Merger Motives

MERGER MOTIVES OF ACQUIRED FIRMS
The evidence presented in the preceding chapter establishes
that merger activity has been a growing phenomenon during the
last decade. Furthermore, this activity has increasingly involved
Nebraska firms. It is the purpose of this chapter to examine possible explanations for this rapid merger advance and to explore
possible motives underlying merger agreements. Of course, there
are two parties to any merger agreement so merger motives of the
acquired firm, as well as those of the purchaser, need to be scrutinized.
It would appear from a survey of the relevant literature that,
while a great deal of attention has been devoted to merger motivations, this attention has been one-sided. That is, most discussions
of merger motives are analyses of why firms desire to purchase
other firms or why two relatively equal-sized corporations wish to
combine. The Nebraska experience, however, is largely one characterized by large firms purchasing smaller local enterprises. In
Chapter IV it will be shown that these acquired firms do not, on
the average, appear to be failing enterprises at the time of acquisition. Therefore, it is of interest to attempt an assessment of the
reasons why these local firms agree to become a part of a larger
corporate structure. *
Assessing another person's motives for undertaking a particular
action is a precarious business. This is particularly true with respect
to merger decisions, since these decisions are often made jointly
by several individuals. One individual's motive for selling control
of the business may be quite different from the motives of other
parties to the decision. Furthermore, in asking the decision-makers
why they decided to engage in a merger, hidden motives are not
likely to surface. On the other hand, it is not proper to assume that
all direct responses are less than truthful. Regardless of the potential
* Some mergers, of course, result from stock takeovers which are beyond the
control of the acquired firm. The discussion which follows is concerned with
only those firms which willingly enter into merger agreements.
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biases, expressed merger motives provide a logical starting point
for a broad discussion of the complex merger-motivation question.
EXPRESSED MERGER MOTIVES OF NEBRASKA ACQUIRED FIRMS

In order to ascertain possible motives associated with agreeing
to be acquired, the author surveyed 23 executives of Nebraska firms
which were acquired during the period 1964-1968. Each of these
executives was associated with the acquired Nebraska firm at the
time of acquisition. * Fifteen of the Nebraska firms were acquired
by firms located outside of the state; eight, by other Nebraska-based
concerns.
In each case, the executive was given a list of potential merger
motives and was asked to check those which were applicable to his
firm's merger. He was then asked to rank the applicable motives
by numbering them. If motives other than those listed were involved, the respondent was asked to check "Other" and was given
space to amplify on this as well as on the other choices.

TABLE 3-1
MERGER MOTIVES AS EXPRESSED BY EXECUTIVES OF
ACQUIRED NEBRASKA FIRMS

Nebraska -Ou tsta te
Motives

First
Choice

Death of owner
0
To solve estate tax problems
I
To obtain corporate or personal income
tax advantages
0
To acquire greater financial resources
I
To obtain marketing advantages
0
To obtain research and development
advantages
I
Pl'Oduct diversification
I
To enhance growth potential
3
Aging management
I
To obtain stock market listing
0
Attractiveness of acquirer's offer
5
To obtain production economies
0
Other
2
Total
15

I Mention
Other

Nebraska-Nebraska
First
Choice

Other
Mention

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
5
5

0
2

I
I

I

2

2

0
0
2

0

I
I

3
2
2
0
0
21

I

I

0
1
0
1
8

0

I

4
I

3
0
14

* A total of 75, five-page questionnaires were mailed to acquired Nebraska
firms. Fifty-one of the firms responded to the questionnaire. Of these 51 responses,
23 were former executives of the acquired company who thus could meaningfully
answer the question dealing with merger motives of the acquired company.
Owing to the obvious limitations of the survey technique and the nature of the
sample, the author does not, of course, seek to make statistical inferences from
the data. Rather the data provide an interesting starting point for a general
discussion on motives.
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Tables 3-1 and 3-2 describe the results of the survey. The responses are divided into Nebraska-Nebraska and Nebraska-Outstate
categories.
TABLE

3-2

MERGER MOTIVES AS EXPRESSED BY EXECUTIVES OF ACQUIRED
NEBRASKA FIRMS, COMBINED TABULATION

Nebraska·Outstate
and Nebraska-Nebraska
Motives
Death of owner
To solve estate tax problems
To obtain corporate or personal
income tax advantages
To acquire grea ter financial
resources
To obtain marketing advantages
To obtain research and
development advantages
Product diversification
To enhance growth potential
Aging management
To obtain stock market listing
Attracti1'lCness of acquirer's offer
To obtain production economies
Other
Total

First
Choice

Other
Mention

Total
Mention

0

0
0

0

3

6

9

1

7

8

1
1

2
2
5
4
2
3
3

3
3

I

I

0

5
2
0
6
0

3
23

0

35

10
6

2
9

3
3
58

AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEBRASKA SURVEY

The most cited reasons for agreeing to be acquired were the
following, in descending order:
1. The enhancement of growth potential.
2. The acquisition of greater financial resources.
3. The attractiveness of the acquirer's offer.
4. The realization of marketing advantages.
Closer inspection of Table 3-2, however, indicates that the
responses associated with items 1 and 4 above were mainly second-,
third-, and fourth-ranked responses. In terms of first-ranked motives,
"the attractiveness of the acquirer's offer," and "the enhancement
of growth potential" were clearly dominant, constituting 47.82 percent of all first-choice responses.
While a diversity of merger motives was cited, there existed a
conspicuous lack of responses indicating efficiency-type motives.
Three such categories, "production economies," "research and development economies," and "marketing economies," were cited as
first-choice motives for merging in only two of the 23 questionnaires.
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Of the Nebraska-Outstate mergers involved in the survey, 68.75
percent were conglomerate. This fact apparently explains why only
6.67 percent of the executives in this group selected one of the
"efficiency" motives as a first choice. Conglomerate mergers, by their
very nature, enable few, if any, true economies. It is interesting to
note, however, that only one of the eight Nebraska-Nebraska respondents indicated one of the "efficiency" motives as a primary
reason for his merger. Inasmuch as 75 percent of these firms were
engaged in horizontal or vertical mergers, a higher proportion of
"efficiency" responses might have been expected.
The "product diversification" category received only a single
first-choice mention from the executives of firms acquired by outof-state corporations. This might seem strange in light of the fact
that a large percentage of these mergers were conglomerate combinations. However, it must be remembered that the reasons cited
are those associated with the acquired firm and not those of the
acquiring corporation.
What might be concluded from the Nebraska survey? First, it
must be remembered that the questionnaire approach is of limited
usefulness. Therefore, it is extremely risky to make inferences, statistical or otherwise, from the data. However, assuming a tolerable
amount of bias, one might conclude that, insofar as the acquired
firms are concerned:
1. Nebraska merger motives are, in general, quite diverse.
2. Merger motives cited by involved executives tend to indicate
that financial considerations, e.g., the attractiveness of the
acquirer's offer, are more important than motives centering
around obtaining efficiencies or economies.
3. Many of the executives surveyed were of the opinion that
the merger would enhance the growth of the local firm.
THE OVERALL MERGER CLIMATE
Inasmuch as "the attractiveness of the acquirer's offer" was one
of the most-cited merger motives given by executives of acquired
Nebraska firms, one must examine the overall merger climate which
has enabled larger corporations to advance attractive offers to
smaller localized firms. In other words, one must examine the other
side of the merger coin.
It would appear that the thrust of the recent merger phenomenon has come from a desire to acquire, as opposed to a desire to
be purchased. If the limited Nebraska data are representative, it
would seem that the attractiveness of the buyer'S offer looms as a
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large motivation in many decisions to merge. In order to be able
to make an attractive offer, the acquirer must feel that the merger
will result in substantial financial benefits. The questions which
need to be answered, therefore, are "What financial benefits are
likely to be realized from a corporate merger?" and "How are these
benefits related to the current merger phenomenon?"
MERGERS AND THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Merger activity is positively correlated with overall business
activity. According to Willard F. Mueller, former director of the
Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission:
The conclusion suggested by our analysis is this: Although
there may be a variety of unique reasons underlying particu.
lar mergers, the overall rate of merger activity is associated
with general economic conditions, and there appears to be a
particularly close relationship between merger activity and
stock prices.!
Business expectations are largely a function of current and expected product demand and profits. In an economic expansion, of
course, current demand and profit levels are relatively high. In
light of these high levels of profits and demand and in the absence
of reasons to expect that the economic expansion will soon recede,
corporations have an incentive to expand their operations. This
expansion may take place via either internal or external corporate
growth. * In many instances, institutional factors serve to encourage
external growth at the expense of internal expansion. These factors
will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter.
In view of the chain of causation explained above, the highly
positive statistical correlation between business activity and mergers
is quite logical. In essence, "prosperity accelerates mergers because
it accelerates business expansion."2
To the extent that stock prices are a proxy of business expectations, it is not surprising to discover also the existence of a close
relationship between these prices and merger activity. Furthermore,
it has been pointed out that during a general upswing in stock
prices disparities are likely to develop in the price-earnings ratio of
various issues. As will be shown later in the chapter, such disparities encourage merger activity since instantaneous gains in earnings per share may be realized.
* Internal growth refers to new investment in plant and equipment and the
expansion of existing operations. External growth refers to expansion via acquisition or merger.
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The merger experience of the 1960's is thus a reflection of 1) an
expanding economy, 2) increasing stock prices, and 3) institutional
factors which, in many instances, encourage growth through acquisition. The tremendous upswing in merger activity in 1967 and
1968, both nationally and in Nebraska, was paralleled by vigorous
economic expansion and a rising stock market.
As stated in the preceding paragraph and alluded to earlier,
certain institutional biases seem to encourage mergers as a method
of corporate expansion. These institutional perpetrators fall into
two basic categories: tax factors and accounting factors. Each factor,
in turn, often enlists the stock market as an ally.
TAX FACTORS ENCOURAGING MERGERS

According to the Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, "The tax laws in the United States create institutional bias
in favor of merger activity. Rather than exerting a neutral influence,
current tax laws actually subsidize mergers."3
Current tax laws subsidize mergers in a variety of ways. Perhaps
the largest and most direct subsidy has resulted under Section 368
of the Internal Revenue Code. Under this statute, capital gains
resulting from particular types of mergers are exempted from taxation. These "tax-free mergers" include acquisitions consummated
through exchanges of voting stock. Thus, a corporation may pay a
significant premium over the market value for the acquired enterprise, yet the acquired firm need pay no tax on the ensuing capital
gain. 4 Thus it is little wonder that "the attractiveness of the acquirer's offer" was a leading response in the Nebraska survey. Indeed,
a large portion of the attractiveness may be due directly to the taxfree nature of the transaction.
According to Federal Trade Commission data, approximately
85 percent of all the large mergers which transpired between 1963
and 1968 received tax-free treatment. Though the author did not
determine how each Nebraska merger was accomplished, he did
acquire such information for three of the largest Nebraska acquisitions. In each of the cases listed in Table 3-3, the merger was consummated via an exchange of stock. Since many of the Nebraska
firms were acquired by large out-of-state corporations, it is safe to
assume that a substantial number of these acquisitions were of the
tax-free variety. However, since the Nebraska-Nebraska mergers
involved on the average small, localized concerns, it is doubtful
that many of these mergers involved exchanges of stock.
Another tax bias which has served to encourage mergers involves
the use of debt-equity switching. If debt securities are exchanged

Merger Motives

/

31

TABLE 3-3
THREE NEBRASKA MERGERS INVOLVING EXCHANGES OF STOCK

Year

Acquirer

Acquiree

Method of Acquisition

1964

Mobil Oil
Corp.

Northern Natural
Gas Producing

The outstanding stock
of Northern acquired
for exchange of
946,500 shares of
Mobil

1964

Rayette Inc.

Tip Top Products
Co.

Tip Top acquired for
483,475 shares of
Rayette on basis of
2 shares of Rayette
for each 9 shares of
Tip Top

1968

Dravo Corp.

Hastings
Industries

All shares of Hastings
acquired for exchange
of 77,000 shares of
Dravo

SOURCE:

Moody's Industrial Journal and Standard and Poors.

for the common stock of an acquired firm, tax savings are realized.
This is the case since interest payments are deductible business expenses for tax purposes. The American Enterprise Institute has
pointed out:
... if the company taken over was conservatively capitalized
and distributed its earnings in the form of dividends, it paid
taxes . . . at the rate of approximately 50 percent. If it is
taken over by means of debt securities, the shareholders are
paid interest instead of dividends and the net income from
the company taken over is increased by the tax benefit from
paying interest, a deductible business expense, which
amounts to about 50 percent of the interest. G
Also, when debt-equity switching is utilized, the capital gains
tax for the seller may be deferred until the due date on the debt
securities. This fact, together with the use of interest as a tax deduction, enables the acquiring firm to make "an attractive offer" to
the corporation it wishes to take over.
Corporate mergers may also create superior estate-tax situations
for individuals who hold controlling interest in acquired firms in
the form of rather closely-held, non-marketable stock. 6 Although
only a single Nebraska respondent indicated estate-tax advantages
as a merger motive, this advantage is obviously a compelling motive
in many small mergers. A Wisconsin survey of 20 executives of
acquired firms reported that 25 percent of the respondents mentioned estate-tax advantages as a merger consideration. 7

32

/

Local Impacts ot Mergers

Yet an additional set of tax biases which has served to encourage
mergers in the United States involves tax losses and tax credits.
Losses, of course, may be carried forward and utilized as tax deductions against income. In industries characterized by high degrees
of obsolesence of plant and equipment and, therefore, by large
losses, individual firms have an incentive to find a merger partner
which has sufficient income to utilize the losses as tax deductions.
Under current corporate tax schedules, "every dollar of profits, net
after taxes, earned by an acquired corporation is worth $2 in the
shelter of an acquiring tax loss corporation."8

In the same vein, investment tax credits have served to induce
merger activity. In the computer, airline, and equipment leasing
industries, in particular, where there have been large investment
expenditures, mergers have been encouraged. This has been the
case since a corporation desires to have sufficient income against
which it can apply all of its investment tax credits. 9
It is obvious from the above discussion that the tax structure
in the United States has been a definite factor underlying the "urge
to merge." As will be noted in the following section, however, additional institutional biases exist which tend to encourage corporate
mergers.
ACCOUNTING FACTORS ENCOURAGING MERGERS

The fact that "generally accepted accounting procedures" include
a wide range of alternative practices has allowed the use of reporting techniques designed to maximize the apparent gains from
mergers. Since the specific method of accounting may change from
one period to another, financial statements may be made to give
an appearance of large gains in profits, assets, and sales, when these
gains may be due solely to acquisitions. Thus mergers, in effect,
are encouraged since they enable a corporation to have an appearance of a vigorously growing concern.
The fact that conglomerate firms usually publish financial reports on a consolidated basis masks the profitability of the individual components and camouflages internal difficulties. As a result,
the true effectiveness of the conglomerate management may be
judged improperly.l0
One of the most abused accounting techniques has been pooling of interests. When a merger is consummated through the exchange of stock, the book value of the assets of the acquired firm is
simply added to the book value of the acquiring company. The true
market value of the acquired firm, however, is usually substantially
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greater than its book value. As a result, the acquiring firm is able
to list the value of the acquired assets at less than the real cost.
These supppressed values produce revenues, however, and since
they are the basis of rate of return computation, the earnings of
the firm are exaggerated. l l
Even greater earnings distortions occur when conglomerates sell
a previously acquired firm. Since the costs of acquiring the firm
were suppressed, the sale generates "instant earnings." These "earnings" occur whenever the book value of the assets of the firm is
less than the sale price. 12
An alternative accounting procedure also may be used to distort
true economic values. The purchase accounting method records the
costs of acquired assets in amounts equal to their book values and
records the excess paid over this amount to a static account entitled
"goodwill." The end result may be much the same as under the
pooling method. Costs may be suppressed and rates of return
inflated. 13
Mergers may contribute to illusory earnings growth in yet
another manner. Instantaneous gains may be realized whenever the
price-earnings ratio of the acquired firm is less than that of the
acquiring company.14
A simple example may illustrate the validity of this statement.
Assume company A, a conglomerate, is the acquiring firm while B
is the acquiree. Assume also that each firm has an annual income of
$1,000 and each has two shares of stock outstanding. Both firms,
therefore, have earnings per share of $500. Assume that A is a
"growth conglomerate" and has a price earnings ratio of 20, while
B has one of 10. Each share of A's stock would be selling for $10,000
(20 x $500). On the other hand, the market value of each ofB's
shares would be $5,000 (10 x $500). The combined value of B's two
shares would be $10,000.
Company A is able to acquire company B for a single share of
A. The conglomerate prints a third share, valued at $10,000, and
gives it to B whose shareholders are delighted to exchange their
$10,000 worth of stock in B for the $10,000 worth of stock in A.
Now one may begin to see the emergence of the instant earnings. A has three shares of stock outstanding and earnings of $2,000.
Earnings per share, therefore, are no longer $500 but $667. The
new price for each share is $13,340 (20 x $667). Thus, as a result of
the merger, earnings per share and price per share have increased.1 5
Since the stock market appears to reward increases in earnings
per share regardless of how these increases are achieved,16 external

Merger Motives

/

35

agerial efficiency. In view of several studies which indicate that
external growth oriented firms are not typically more profitable
than internal growth firms, it would appear that the "synergy"
contention also has very little, if any, solid empirical support. 23
Diversification may provide certain financial advantages to corporations, but it is certainly doubtful that any true economies are
achieved. For example, it has been shown that no significant relationship exists between the degree of diversification and the amount
of expenditures on research and development. 24 Nor is there a
systematic relationship between diversification and inventive outpUt. 25 With respect to the synergy or efficiency contention, the
author must concur with the FTC Staff Report conclusion that:
"The balance of evidence so far available lends little support to
the view that the current merger movement reflects, in substantial
measure, efforts to exploit opportunities to improve efficiencies in
resource allocation. 26
THE SIZE MAXIMIZATION MOTIVE

A very interesting hypothesis concerning merger motivation
has been advanced and tested by Samuel R. Reid. It is Reid's contention that "firms which frequently utilize conglomerate mergers
in their growth strategy tend to be size-maximizers rather than
profit-maximizers and are engaging in a distinct form of 'conspicuous investment.' "27
Professor Reid supports his hypothesis through an extensive
empirical study in which he isolates successfully various effects
of growth strategies. Using analysis of variance, he found that firms
engaged in conglomerate mergers dominated all of the size-related
variables while internal growth firms performed better in "profit-tostockholders" variables. 28
Reid also made separate tests utilizing distinct subsets of the
conglomerate group. Three subgroups were established. One subgroup was labeled "offensive" conglomerates. This group was composed of conglomerates which were extremely aggressive in their
approach to external expansion. These firms were dominated by
finance-oriented management and displayed nearly unbelievable
short-run growth rates. A second subgroup was composed of firms
which did not appear to be following a planned diversification strategy but occasionally undertook a conglomerate acquisition. This
subgroup was entitled the "unique" conglomerates. A final subgroup, "defensive" conglomerates, included firms which diversified
into other industries owing to the declining nature of the demand
for their basic product.
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The analysis of variance technique revealed that each of the
size-related variables "strongly favored the 'offensive' conglomerate
and each was statistically significant."29 When the conglomerate
subgroups were compared to the internal growth subset with respect
to the usual profit maximization variables, the latter group evidenced a clear superiority.
If personal managerial rewards are more closely tied to firm
size than to profitability, and ownership and control are separate,
a plausible rationale for the recent merger wave is established. Professional managers, according to this hypothesis, being personal
gain maximizers, pursue corporate acquisitions even when such
business transactions are unprofitable in the usual economic sense.
At first glance, the "Reid hypothesis" would appear to contradict the tax, accounting, and stock market motives. For if external
growth oriented corporations are not profit maximizers, one might
argue that they would not be induced by motives which are based
upon greater profitability. However, on closer inspection, it becomes
clear that a reconciliation of these seemingly contradictory hypotheses may be achieved.
The reconciliation requires a modification of the pure revenue
or size maximization hypothesis. The Baumol constrained-revenue
maximization modeI,30 for example, is consistent with the combined
motives. In this model it is assumed that the firm will maximize
revenue subject to a minimum or "satisficing" rate of return on
investment. Given the tax, accounting, and stock market advantages
associated with merger, the firm is able to engage in an otherwise
unprofitable merger, yet realize the financial gains arising from
these factors. These gains serve to offset the basic unprofitable
nature of the acquisition and, as a result, allow profits to remain at
an overall "satisficing" rate. In addition, of course, the firm expands
its total size and revenue, and the professional management is rewarded accordingly.
The Baumol model enables one to maintain the tax, accounting,
and stock market factors as important merger motives. These factors,
in effect, allow the size maximizing firm to make an attractive offer,
yet maintain a satisficing profit level while pursuing a policy of
external expansion.
THE RELATIVE GROWTH OF THE CONGLOMERATE MERGER

The foregoing discussion of various merger motives sheds considerable light on the underlying reasons for the tremendous merger
surge of the last two decades. However, the discussion, at first glance,
seemingly fails to direct itself to the question, "Why has the third
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merger movement increasingly become conglomerate in nature?"
The answer to this question lies embedded within the general discussion of merger motives.
The nature of the institutional factors encouraging merger, as
well as the nature of the legal restraints on merger activity, have
served to channel the recent merger movement toward unrelated
diversification. The Celler-Kefauver Amendment to Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, as was alluded in Chapter Ill, does not appear successfully to have suppressed the current merger wave. However, this
so-termed "anti-merger amendment" has been at least partially
responsible for changing the nature of the merger movement. Specifically, the evidence indicates that horizontal and vertical mergers
have come under at least moderate attack by the Federal Trade
Commission and the Justice Department. * This attack, so the argument goes, has led many corporate executives to believe that horizontal and vertical mergers invite federal investigation. As a result,
corporations much prefer the conglomerate merger as a means to
expand their corporate control. 3 !
Although granting that the "anti-merger amendment" has been
of considerable influence in directing the merger wave toward
conglomerates, this explanation, taken alone, is insufficient. Rather,
the institutional factors which have encouraged mergers (in general)
have encouraged conglomerate type mergers to an even greater
extent. The tax advantages discussed earlier in the chapter, for
example, are often of such a nature that a firm by necessity is forced
to go outside its own industry to find a partner. This is particularly
true if tax loss carryovers or investment tax credits are involved.
Also, given the advantages associated with debt-equity switching, a
conservatively capitalized firm, regardless of its industry, is a potential target. When a "good buy" of this nature arises, one takes it.
If the firm happens to be in another industry, so be it.
The accounting factors, in particular, have encouraged conglomerate mergers. The fact that firms of diverse product line are
brought together allows greater flexibility in achieving "accounting
earnings" since it becomes nearly impossible for investors to determine what each part is contributing to the whole. Likewise, the
desire for instantaneous gains in earnings per share, via mergers
involving firms with low price earnings ratios, compels firms to
look throughout American industry for merger partners rather
than to limit the horizon to one's own particular industry.
* Since the enactment of the Celler-Kefauver Act, over 800 mergers have been
challenged, practically all of which were horizontal, vertical, or market-extension.
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The desire to place oneself in a position which will allow crosssubsidization may also be an important factor in the conglomerate
merger phenomenon. Also, the size-maximization hypothesis lends
itself readily as an explanation for the growth of conglomerates.
Firms wishing to maximize size, revenues, and corporate power
must look beyond their own industry if they are successfully to
avoid antitrust action. Furthermore, if these firms are indeed empire-builders, the conglomerate structure provides a remarkable
base of economic power and prestige.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

It would appear that the conglomerate nature of the current
merger wave is due largely to a new set of merger motives. These
motives are not as directly anticompetitive as were the motives
underlying the first two merger movements. Nor do they revolve
around a desire to achieve economies. Since this is the case, and
since the inducements seem to be so compelling, the acquiring firm
is largely indifferent to the industry classification of the potential
partner. It would appear that the urge to merge transcends product
lines as it does broad industry classifications.
Rather than being forced toward a conglomerate nature by the
Celler-Kefauver Amendment, the current merger wave has been
largely drawn toward that nature by the conglomerate's unique
ability to maximize revenues and managerial income, maximize
investors' capital gains, and satisfice actual economic profits.
The desire to find a merger partner is a complex one. It would
appear that a diversity of merger motives exists and that each
merger may be undertaken for a variety of reasons. However, it
appears that institutional biases promote mergers by rewarding
external expansion. These rewards, in turn, allow the purchaser to
make extremely attractive offers to the potential acquiree. In many
instances, the desire to acquire is based upon a constrained revenue
maximization motive. The empirical evidence seems to suggest overwhelmingly that few true economies of scale are associated with
most large mergers.

IV / Local Employment and Payroll Effects
of Corporate Acquisition.r

As stated in Chapter I, the conventional wisdom with respect
to local impacts of merger activity contends that acquired firms are
typically slowly growing, poorly managed concerns. Upon acquisition, new management, together with new and larger sources of
capital, serve to re-invigorate the local operation. As a result, according to this widespread belief, profits, employment, and payrolls will
likely expand following the acquisition. This expansion will produce multiplicative economic benefits within the community of
the acquired firm.
The proponents of the conventional wisdom, of course, do not
suggest that local acquisitions will be beneficial in all instances.
Nor would they contend that no negative effects exist. Rather, adherents of this view believe that, in general, net local benefits will
be highly positive.
THE WISCONSIN MERGER STUDY

The Wisconsin merger study indirectly tested the conventional
wisdom by examining pre- and post-merger employment and payroll data.! This study found that "the average pre-merger Wisconsin
employment growth rate of out-of-state acquired firms was 6.02
percent. Following the mergers, their employment growth rate declined to -.48 percent.'·2 Payrolls also were adversely affected by
the acquisitions. The pre-merger aggregate payroll growth rate
among firms acquired by out-of-state corporations was 10.47 percent;
the post-merger rate, 3.68 percent.
The Wisconsin findings cast considerable doubt upon the general validity of the conventional wisdom. These results are less than
conclusive, however. Methodological weaknesses in the Wisconsin
research serve to leave unanswered the question of local employment and payroll impacts of corporate acquisitions.
The most serious weakness in the Wisconsin methodology is
that conclusions were based exclusively upon comparisons of preand post-merger growth rates. Cyclical fluctuations were ignored
39
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on the contention that the period under study, 1960-1968, was
basically one of general economic expansion. Indeed, cyclical fluctuations were relatively slight during this period. However, cyclical
and/or secular trends within individual industries may run counter
to overall cyclical and secular trends.
Thus, data indicating that the acquired firms did not grow,
on the average, as rapidly as they had grown before the merger
do not isolate the merger as the causative factor. Perhaps a significant number of the acquired firms were in industries which witnessed declining employment and payroll growth rates during the
period. If this were the case, the acquired firms would show a decrease in their aggregate average post-merger growth rate. Yet these
firms may have experienced employment and payroll growth at
rates equal to or greater than the majority of the firms in their
respective industries. "Before" and "after" comparisons simply
fail to exclude numerous potential causative factors and thereby
do not isolate the true merger effects.
Other weaknesses in the Wisconsin study are apparent. One has
no way of knowing, for example, if observed differences in growth
rates are statistically significant or are sampling variations within
the larger Wisconsin merger movement. Also, the ''''isconsin research lacks adequate economic analysis of its findings. One is left
with no rationale to explain the indicated results.
NEBRASKA STUDY METHODOLOGY

The Wisconsin research results, however, regardless of their
limitations, definitely offer a clear alternative hypothesis to the
conventional wisdom. The Wisconsin study has raised an important
issue, and the Nebraska findings shed additional light upon it.
Obviously, that which is true for acquired firms located in Nebraska need not be true for firms in other states. However, as will
be shown in Chapter V, the recent Nebraska merger experience
appears to be typical of the acquisition patterns involving firms in
other sparsely populated neighboring states. The Nebraska merger
sample is believed to be highly representative of the larger population of acquired firms within the Midwestern region. As a consequence, inferences transcending the actual Nebraska experience
are drawn.
As described in Chapter II, 149 Nebraska mergers were identified as having occurred during the 1964-1968 period. A sample of
90 acquired firms was drawn for purposes of testing the employment
and payroll impacts of the mergers. Fifty-one of the 90 acquisitions
consisted of Nebraska firms acquired by out-of-state corporations
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and the remaining 39 involved the acquisition of one Nebraska
firm by another.
Employment and 4th quarter payroll data were collected on each
of the acquired firms in the sample. These data were obtained
through the Research and Statistics Department of the Division of
Employment, State Labor Department. All Nebraska firms covered
under unemployment compensation laws are required to file employment and payroll reports to this agency on a regular basis.
December employment and 4th quarter payroll data were utilized
since these data had the advantage of usually being post-merger
data in the year of the merger.
The use of December and 4th quarter data did not bias the
study. Average annual rates of change in employment and payroll,
not changes of employment or payroll within a single year, were
employed in the statistical tests. Since December and 4th quarter
data were used consistently in computing these rates of change,
seasonality is of no consequence. The annual rates of change, so
computed, will logically approximate those employing data from
any other single month.
Employment and payroll data were collected for five years prior
to each merger and for five years following it. In the case of 1967
mergers, data for only four post-merger years were available; for
1968 acquisitions, three post-merger years. *
Once these data were collected, both pre- and post-merger average annual rates of change were computed. The average annual
rate of change is equivalent to r in the following equation:
I

+r =

(Y jX)1/n where,

X = original value, Y = new value, and n = the number of years
between values. The sum 1 + r, of course, is simply the geometric
mean of the annual relative changes. t
Since the author desired to eliminate the methodological weaknesses of the Wisconsin study, each acquired Nebraska firm was
matched against a hypothetical average firm in its industry. For each
of the appropriate years, SIC 2-digit aggregate December employment and 4th quarter payroll data were collected. These data were
divided by the number of firms within each industry at each time
period. This, of course, yielded an average December employment
* Since the data are from December, the year of the merger is a post· merger
year.
t This equation is an alternative presentation of the familiar discounting
formula. The need for computing a geometric mean, in fact, arises from the
need to take compounding into consideration.
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figure and an average 4th quarter payroll figure for each 2-digit
industry in each appropriate year. It was then possible to compute
the growth rates for average firms and match them against the
growth rates of the acquired firms. *
An example will perhaps clarify the matching process. Company
A was acquired in April of 1966. Its 4-digit SIC classification was
5824. The pre-merger employment growth rate, 1961-1965, was
computed as was the rate of growth of the hypothetical average firm
in SIC industry 58. The same five-year period was utilized in computing each growth rate. In a similar manner, pre-merger and
post-merger payroll growth rates were computed for both the acquired firm and its hypothetical industry counterpart.
The correlated match technique allowed one to test statistically
the hypotheses under question. If the conventional wisdom was
valid, the mean pre-merger growth rates of the acquired firms should
have been significantly smaller than those of the match group. On
the other hand, the mean post-merger employment and payroll rates
of the acquired firms should have been equal to, or greater than,
the mean rates of the hypothetical firms.
If merged firms were typical of other Nebraska firms with respect
to growth rates, either pre- or post-merger, then one would have
expected to find no significant difference between the mean growth
rate of such firms and the mean growth rate of the hypothetical
average firms. That is, the mean of the differences between the
rates of the two groups would have been approximately zero. Since
the hypothetical firms displayed the average characteristics of their
industries, approximately one-half of the acquired firms should
have had growth rates greater than these hypothetical firms; the
other half, smaller rates.
The above tendency allowed the author to employ statistical
techniques which test the differences between group means. Specifically, two-tailed, correlated matched-pair t tests were utilized. In
each test the null hypothesis was zero difference between means,
f-tx = f-ty. The alternative hypotheses were f-tx < f-ty and f-tx > f-ty. The
* SIC 2-digit industry data were utilized in computing the growth rates of
the hypothetical average firms because they were available. Since the 2-digit
industries were quite broad, the hypothetical average firms had heterogeneous
natures. However, the employment of 4-digit aggregate data would have necessitated prohibitively time-consuming and costly computations. Furthermore,
many 4-digit Nebraska industries were composed of only a few firms. As a result,
the growth rates of the hypothetical average firms in these 4-digit industries
might have been influenced unduly by entry and exit of firms. The 2-digit
industries had the advantage of being sufficiently broad to include numerous
Nebraska firms.
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decision to retain or reject the null hypothesis was made at the
.1 0 level of significance.
The 90 firms in the sample were divided into two basic groups,
Nebraska-Nebraska and Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions. These main
groups were divided into subgroups based upon firm size, broad
industry classification, and type of merger. In all, 136 matched-pair
t tests were performed. These tests required the computation of
approximately 1,000 separate average annual growth rates.
DATA PROBLEMS

A troublesome methodological problem was encountered with
respect to the Nebraska-Nebraska merger data. When a Nebraska
firm acquired another Nebraska firm, subsequent employment and
payroll reporting was of two types. Some of the merged firms continued to report employment and payroll for both of the individual
units. When this was the case, no problem occurred. However, many
of the merged firms "pooled interests" and thus reported a single,
combined employment and payroll. When this occurred, postmerger growth rates included the growth of both the acquired and
acquiring units. This fact made it impossible to determine the
portion of the post-merger growth rate which was attributable to
the acquired component.
Matched-pair t tests were performed for the pre-merger growth
rates of both the acquiring and acquired units in the NebraskaNebraska cases. However, since the majority of post-merger rates
involved the combined growth of the components of the merged
firms, the post-merger Nebraska-Nebraska analysis is somewhat
limited.
Fortunately, as will be shown in the following chapter, the
Nebraska-Outstate mergers, as opposed to the Nebraska-Nebraska
ones, are of primary economic concern. The Nebraska-Nebraska
acquisitions generally involved small acquirees, and business control remained within the state.
The Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions did not present the data
problems associated with the instate mergers. Nearly all of the outstate acquisitions involved acquiring firms which did not have
Nebraska operations prior to their acquisition. In most of those
cases in which pre-merger Nebraska operations did exist, the firms
continued to file separate reports for the acquired firms.
PRE-MERGER GROWTH RATES: NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE ACQUISITIONS

The matched-pair t tests on the Nebraska-Outstate employment
and payroll data do not support the contention that acquired firms
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are typically slow-growing concerns. Table 4-1 reports the results of
the Nebraska-Outstate pre-merger employment tests; Table 4-2, the
results of the payroll tests. In each of the tables, and those which
follow, n = number of pairs, X = sample mean of average annual
change for the test group, Y = sample mean of average annual
change for the match group, t = test statistic, [lD = the population
difference between ~lx and fly. All italicized t values indicate significant differences at, or below, the .10 level.
As shown in Table 4-1, the mean annual pre-merger employment growth rate of 51 Nebraska firms acquired by out-of-state firms
was 1.257 percent. The mean growth rate of the hypothetical average firms was 1.656 percent. This slight difference was not statistically significant. The null hypothesis, zero difference between means,
was therefore retained with 90 percent confidence in the correctness
of the decision.
Of course, the retention of the null hypothesis, in itself, does not
allow one to reject the alternative hypotheses. The width and position of the confidence interval, however, allows one to conclude
that the two groups are not sufficiently different to accept the conventional wisdom. The interval tends to suggest that the mean
difference of the populations is near the hypothesized location
(zero).
Table 4-1 also indicates the results of several subgroup tests.
In each instance, the null hypothesis was retained. It might be noted
that acquired firms which were involved in product extension mergers were characterized by a very rapid pre-merger employment
growth rate while firms involved in horizontal, vertical, and geographic market extension combinations had slightly negative annual growth rates. In each instance, however, the differences
between the test groups and their matched pairs were not found
to be statistically significant.
The results of the payroll tests as shown in Table 4-2 yield
similar conclusions to those inferred from the pre-merger employment tests. The average annual pre-merger payroll growth rate
of the 51 acquired firms was 6.958 percent while the pre-merger
rate of the matched group was 4.929 percent. Though this difference
was not significant and the null hypothesis was retained (along with
the alternative hypotheses), the location of the confidence interval
once again serves to discredit the contention that acquired firms
are usually slow-growing or dying enterprises.
In conclusion, it would appear that firms acquired by nonNebraska corporations are typical Nebraska firms insofar as pre-
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RESULTS OF NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE PRE-MERGER EMPLOYMENT
T TESTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS

Test Group

All Firms
(n=51)
Type
Horizontal and Vertical
(n= 11)
Geographic Market Extension
(n'= 19)
Product Extension
(n= 14)
Pure Conglomcrate
Broad Industry
Manufacturing
(n=22)
Trade
(n= 14)
Services
(n = 15)
Employment
Size of
Acquired Firm
Over 100
(n= 19)
Under 100
(n=32)

X

Y

1.257

1.656
Conf(-1.483

Dccision
-0.619
~ j.tn ~

Rctain

+ .687) =

j.tx

=

j.ty

90%

-0.797

0.408

-0.471

Retain

j.tX

=

j.ty

-0.990

0.962

-0.903

Retain

j.tx

=

j.ty

6.515

3.823

0.954

Retain

j.tX

=

j.ty

0.065

1.167

1.610

2.223

-0.481

Retain

j.tx

=

j.ty

3.051

0.328

1.000

Retain

j.tx

=

j.ty

-0.936

2.049

-1.039

Retain

j.tX

=

j.ty

1.256

3.147

-0.844

Retain

j.tx

=

j.ty

1.257

0.771

0.320

Retain

j.tX

=

j.ty

a No test performed because of the small sample size.

merger growth of employment and payroll is concerned. This is
of course a "general" conclusion. Obviously some acquired firms
are slowly growing or negatively growing concerns; others are v~ry
rapidly expanding companies. The former, however, certainly do
not appear to outweigh the latter.
PRE-MERGER GROWTH RATES:

NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA ACQUISITIONS

Tables 4-3 and 4-4 report the results of the Nebraska-Nebraska
pre-merger employment and payroll tests, respectively. These tables
reveal that the average acquiring Nebraska firm was growing faster
than the typical Nebraska acquiree. This was particularly true for
pre-merger payroll growth. Although the acquiring firms in the
sample were growing at average annual employment and payroll
rates of 2.920 and 6.641 percent respectively, and their matched
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TABLE 4-2
RESULTS OF THE NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE PRE-MERGER PAYROLL
T TESTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS

Test Group

All Firms
(n = 51)
Type
Horizontal and Vertical
(n= 11)
Geographic Market Extension
(n= 19)
Product Extension
(n 14)
Pure Conglomerate
(n = 7)

=

x

y

6.958

4.929
Conf(-1.932

Decision
Retain !-Lx = !-LY

0.877
~!-Ln ~

+ 5.990) =

90%

= !-LY

3.946

4.448

--0.183

7.819

3.648

0.760

Retain !-Lx = !-LY

9.859

7.244

0.791

Retain !-Lx = !-LY

3.553

4.705

Retain !-Lx

Broad Industry
Manufacturing
(n= 22)
Trade
(n = 14)
Services
(n= 15)

6.505

5.653

0.499

Retain !-Lx = !-Ly

5.959

4.202

0.567

Retain !-Lx = !-LY

8.554

4.553

1.5lO

Retain !-Lx = !-LY

Employment
Size of
Acquired Firm
Over 100
(n= 19)
Under lOO
(n=32)

lO.077

6.062

0.748

Retain !-Lx = !-LY

5.106

4.257

0.440

Retain !-Lx = !-LY

R

No test performed owing to the small sample size.

pairs were expanding at mean rates of 0.420 and 3.805, these differences were not found to be statistically significant. This was also
the case in the tests involving the acquired firms.
The test of all acquired firms does not allow one to conclude
that such firms have slower growth rates than do typical nonacquired firms. In one of the subgroup tests, however, the null
hypothesis was rejected. Those Nebraska firms engaged in "Trade"
displayed a statistically lower mean annual pre-merger payroll
growth rate than did their control group. The test group had a
mean of -4.322 while the match group possessed a mean of 4.147.
It may be concluded with 90 percent confidence that Nebraska
firms engaged in trade which were acquired by other Nebraska firms
typically had relatively small or negative rates of payroll growth
prior to their acquisitions.
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TABLE 4-3
RESULTS OF NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA PRE-MERGER EMPLOYMENT
T TESTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS

Test Group
All Acquiring Firms
(n=30)
All Acquired Finns
(n=39)

x

y

2.920

0.420

Decision
1.409

Conf(-.517
-0.181

~ ltD ~

-0.009

Conf(-3.705

+5.515) = 90%

-0.099
~

Retain Itx = Ity

Retain Itx = Ity

ltD ~ + 3.361) = 90%

Type (Acquired f'irm)
Horizontal and Vertical
(n=20)
Conglomerate
(n= 19)
Broad Industry
Manufacturinga
(n 14)
Trade
(n = 17)
Services b
(n=8)

=

0.532

-0.213

0.378

Retain Itx = Ity

-0.405

0.206

-0.205

Retain Itx = Ity

2.917

-0.683

1.522

Retain Itx = Ity

-4.482

0.492

-1.746

Retain Itx = Ity

4.787

0.840

a Includes mining.
No test performed because of the small sample size.

h

TABLE 4-4
RESULTS OF NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA PRE-MERGER PAYROLL
T TESTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS

Test Group
All Acquiring Firms
(n= 30)
All Acquired Firms
(n= 39)

x

y

6.641

3.805

Decision
1.596

Conf(-.190
1.682

3.538

(Conf(-5.141

~

Retain Itx = Ity

ltD ~ +5.862):=: 90%

-0.955
~ ltD ~

Retain Itx = Ity

+ 1.429) = 90%

Type (Acquired Firm)
Horizontal and Vertical
(n = 20)
Conglomerate
(n= 19)
Broad Industry
Manufacturing'
(n = 14)
Trade
(n= 17)
Services b
(n = 8)

1.003

3.500

-1.065

Retain Itx = Ity

1.916

3.580

-0.522

Retain Itx = Ity

3.717

2.684

0.655

Retain Itx = Ity

--4.322

4.147

11.003

3.739

a Includes mining.
No test performed because of the small sample size.

b

-3.162(-°') Accept Itx < Ity
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It should be noted that the pre-merger employment growth rate
for acquired firms engaged in trade was also strongly negative.
Nevertheless, the null hypothesis was accepted in the employment
case.
Returning to Tables 4-1 and 4-2, one may see that the significant
mean difference in the Nebraska-Nebraska "Trade" group is peculiar to the Nebraska-Nebraska acquisitions. The "Trade" firms
which were acquired by non-Nebraska corporations did not have
mean growth rates significantly smaller than their matched pairs.
No test was performed on the Nebraska-Nebraska "Services"
subgroup owing to the small sample size, but the firms in the
sample possessed extremely rapid mean pre-merger employment and
payroll rates relative to their hypothetical average industry counterparts.
Interestingly, the pre-merger mean rates of firms acquired by
non-Nebraska corporations exceeded those acquired by other Nebraska concerns in nearly every case. At the same time, the industry
rates were generally slower in the Nebraska-Nebraska cases. A logical interpretation of the latter difference is that Nebraska firms
acquired by other Nebraska firms were typically in slower growing
industries than were those firms acquired by non-Nebraska corporations.
The conventional wisdom may be descriptive of small localized
mergers as evidenced by the "Trade" category in the NebraskaN ebraska tables. Though the null hypothesis was retained in all
but one of the pre-merger Nebraska-Nebraska tests, the alternative
hypothesis (the conventional wisdom) need not be rejected. The
Nebraska-Nebraska pre-merger experience is much less conclusive
than the Nebraska-Outstate experience.
POST-MERGER GROWTH RATES: NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE ACQUISITIONS

If corporate acquisitions of Nebraska firms by non-Nebraska
corporations served to accelerate the growth of the Nebraska firms,
one would expect to discover that their average post-merger employment and payroll growth rates would exceed both their pre-merger
rates and those of average firms within their industries. This is
definitely not the case. In fact, the opposite is true. The NebraskaOutstate firms in the sample had substantially faster pre-merger
rates than post-merger, and of even greater consequence, their postmerger rates were significantly smaller than those of the industry
control group.
Table 4-5 compares the pre- and post-merger employment and
payroll rates of firms acquired by non-Nebraska corporations. In

Effects of Acquisitions

/

49

both the employment and payroll cases, post-merger rates were
substantially lower than pre-merger ones. The 51 firms in the
sample were growing at an average annual pre-merger employment
rate of 1.257 percent. The mean post-merger rate declined to
-8.353 percent. The average annual pre-merger payroll rates for
the acquired firms was nearly 7 percent; the post-merger rate,
-1.592 percent. Similar results were discovered in each of the test
subgroups. For example, the firms acquired in product extension
mergers were growing at a pre-merger rate of 6.515 percent while
their post-merger growth averaged -10.154 percent.
The results reported in Table 4-5, of course, do not conclusively demonstrate the true merger effects. In the case of the 19661968 mergers, 1970 employment and payroll data were utilized as

TABLE 4-5
COMPARISONS OF NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE PRE- AND POST-MERGERS
EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL GROWTH RATES

Test Group

All Firms
(n=51)
Type
Horizontal and Vertical
(n = 11)
Geographic Market Extension
(n= 19)
Product Extension
(n = 14)
Pure Conglomerate
(n= 7)
Broad Industry
Manufacturing
(n =22)
Trade
(n= 14)
Services
(n= 15)
Employment
Size of
Acquired Firm
Over 100
(n= 19)
Under 100
(n=32)

Employment
Growth Rate

Payroll
Growth Rate

PreMerger

PostMerger

PreMerger

PostMerger

1.257

-8.353

6.958

-1.592

-0.797

-9.338

3.946

--4.862

-0.990

-6.646

7.819

1.548

6.515

-10.154

9.859

-3.267

0.065

-7.834

3553

-1.622

1.610

-11.085

6.505

-5.249

3.051

-9.982

5.959

-3.292

-0.936

-2.826

8.554

5.360

1.256

-8.932

10.007

-1.552

1.257

-8.633

5.106

-1.615
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the final post-merger figures in calculating post-merger growth rates.
Therefore, these rates reflect the impact of the 1970 recession.
The matched-pair tests eliminated this problem, however. Since
the post-merger growth rates of the hypothetical average firms also
were based upon 1970 data for the 1966-1968 mergers, the postmerger comparisons between these hypothetical firms and the acquired firms eliminated the cyclical problem. The post-merger
matched-pair technique sufficiently isolated the true merger effects. *
Tables 4-6 and 4-7 report the results of the post-merger employment
and payroll tests.
As may be seen in Table 4-6, corporate mergers involving nonNebraska acquirers appear to have had adverse impacts upon the
employment growth of the acquired firms. It should be recalled
that the mean pre-merger employment growth rates of the test and
control groups were found to be near the hypothesized location
(f!D = 0). In other words, acquired Nebraska firms had pre-merger
employment growth rates very similar to typical Nebraska firms.
This was not the case post-merger. With 90 percent confidence, one
may conclude that post-merger employment growth rates of acquired
firms typically are significantly smaller than average Nebraska firms.
During the post-merger years, the hypothetical average firms
were growing at an average employment rate of 1.618 percent. This
compares favorably with their pre-merger rate of 1.656 percent. The
average annual post-merger rate of the acquired firms, however,
was -8.353 percent. As may be noted in Table 4-6, the adverse employment effects occurred regardless of the type of merger or the
firm size. Only in the subgroup "Services" was no significant difference noted. It would appear that the Nebraska-Outstate mergers have definitely had an adverse employment impact within
Nebraska.t
"The merger effects are not totally isolated since the post· merger growth
rates of the hypothetical average firms included the rates of the acquired firms.
If mergers had an adverse impact upon the acquired firms, for example, then
the post-merger industry average rate would be reduced. As a result, the ob·
served differences between the growth rates of the acquired firms and the industry
average firms would slightly understate the true differences between acquired
firms and non-acquired firms. Since in all cases the employment and payroll of
the acquired firms were only small portions of the total industry employment
and payroll, this bias is minimal.
t A matched-pair 4-digit test performed by the author on 21 Nebraska firms
acquired by conglomerates also supports this general conclusion. The acquired
firms were paired against similar-sized, non-acquired Nebraska firms on a 4-digit
industry basis. The differences in pre-merger growth rates were not statistically
significant. However, the average post-merger employment of the acquired group
was significantly lower than that of the non-acquired firms.
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TABLE 4-6
RESULTS

OF

NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE

POST-MERGER

EMPLOYMENT

T TESTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS

Test Group
All Firms
(n=5l)
Type
Horizontal and Vertical
(n= 11)
Geographic Market Extension
(n = 19)
Product Extension
(n=14)
Pure Conglomerate>
(n= 7)
Industry of the
Acquired Firm
Manufacturing
(n = 22)
Trade
(n = 14)
Services
(n=15)
Employment
Size of
Acquired Finn
Over 100
(n= 19)
Under 100
(n= 32)
a

x

y

-8.353

1.618

Decision
-3.107(·01) Accept Itx < Ity

(Conf(-14.878::O=:: ltD ::0=:: -5.064)

= 90%
< Ity

-9.338

1.708

-2.105(-'0) Accept Itx

-6.646

1.600

-1.556

-10.154

1.164

-1.926(·10) Accept Itx

< itT

-7.834

1.139

-11.085

0.324

-3.072(·01) Accept Itx

< Ity

-9.982

2.516

-3.422(·01) Accept Itx

< Ity

-2.826

3.080

-0.935

-8.932

0.942

-2.278(·0') Accept Itx < Ity

-8.633

1.223

-2.498(·02) Accept Itx < Ity

Retain Itx = Ity

Retain Itx = Ity

No test performed owing to small sample size.

The results of the Nebraska-Outstate post-merger payroll tests,
Table 4-7, closely parallel those of the employment tests. The acquired companies exhibited an average annual post-merger payroll
growth rate of -1.592 percent while the control group had an
average of 6.282 percent. This difference was significant at the .01
level.
Manufacturing firms were particularly adversely affected by the
mergers. The hypothetical average firms engaged in manufacturing
had an average annual payroll growth rate of 5.609 percent during
the post-merger years. The acquired manufacturing firms, however,
had a negative post-merger rate of -5.248.
Firms with more than 100 employees were growing at an average
pre-merger payroll rate of 10.077 percent. This growth declined to
a post-merger rate of -1.552 percent. This rate was significantly
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lower than the mean rate displayed by the hypothetical average
firms during the same post-merger years. Likewise, a significant
difference was observed in the "Under 100 employees" category.
These firms had an average annual post-merger growth rate of
-1.615 percent while the control firms had a rate of 7.093 percent.
It would appear that firm size is not an important factor in determining the extent of the reduction in the payroll growth rate.
The conventional wisdom is clearly refuted in the NebraskaOutstate merger evidence. Rather than being slowly-growing firms,
the Nebraska-Outstate evidence indicated that, on the average,
acquired firms were normal. Upon acquisition, however, these firms
experienced adverse employment and payroll effects.

TABLE 4-7
RESULTS OF NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE POST-MERGER PAYROLL
T TESTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS

Test Group
All Firms
(n =51)
Type
Horizontal and Vertical
(n = 11)
Geographic Market Extension
(n = 19)
Product Extension
(n= 14)
Pure Conglomerate
(n=7)
Industry of the
Acquired Firm
Manufacturing
(n = 22)
Trade
(n= 14)
Services
(n = 15)
Employment
Size of
Acquired Finn
Over 100
(n = 19)
Under 100
(n= 32)
a

x

y

-1.592

6.282

Conf(-12.422

Decision

< I-ly

-2.909(·01) Accept I-lx
~ I-lD ~

-3.322) = 90%

-4.862

6.800

-2.012(,10) Accept I-lx < I-ly

1.548

6.238

-1.090

Retain I-lx = I-ly

-3.267

6.130

-1.685

Retain I-lx = I-ly

-1.622

5.889

-5.249

5.609

-2.283(·05) Accept I-lx < I-ly

-3.292

4.918

-2.403("°5) Accept I-lx < I-ly

5.360

8.540

-0.616

-1.552

5.922

-2.203(-05) Accept I-lx < I-ly

-1.615

7.093

-2.265(·05) Accept I-lx

No tests performed owing to small sample size.

Retain I-lx = I-ly

< I-ly
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POST-MERGER GROWTH RATES: NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA ACQUISITIONS

The post-merger employment and payroll tests involving Nebraska-Nebraska acquisitions indicated that those mergers had no
significantly adverse impacts upon employment and payroll in
Nebraska. The average annual post-merger employment and payroll
growth rates of the combined firms were found not to be significantly different from the average rates of the hypothetical industry
average firms. In each of the post-merger tests, the null hypothesis
was retained.
Since it was impossible to determine the proportion of the postmerger growth attributable to the acquired units, no conclusions
could be drawn as to the impact of the mergers on the employment
and payroll of the acquired units. The overall post-merger rates
may represent any combination of growth of the acquired and acquiring units.
In terms of Nebraska employment and payroll, however, it does
not appear that the mergers had either a significantly adverse or
favorable effect. The pre- and post-merger rates are compared III
Table 4-8 and the results of the matched-pair tests are shown III
Tables 4-9 and 4-10.
At least two possible explanations of the marked difference
between the Nebraska-Nebraska and Nebraska-Outstate conclusions may be advanced. The first is that the acquisition of one
Nebraska firm by another precludes the possibility that employment
and payrolls may be transferred to locations outside of the state.
The second explanation is explored later.

TABLE 4-8
COMPARISONS OF NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA PRE- AND POST-MERGER
EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL GROWTH RATES

Employment
Growth Rate

Test Group

PreMerger

PostMerger

Payroll
Growth Rate
PreMerger

Acquiring :Firms
(n = 30)

2.920

6.641

Acquired Firms
(n=39)

-0.181

1.682

Combined Firms
(n = 35)

0.797

PostMerger

6.641
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TABLE 4-9
RESULTS OF NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA POST-MERGER EMPLOYMENT
T TESTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS

Test Group
All Acquired Firms
(n= 35)
Type (Acquired Firm)
Horizontal and Vertical
(n = 20)
Conglomerate
(n = 15)
Broad Industry
Manufacturing'
(n = II)
Trade
(n = 16)
Servicesb
(n=8)

X

Y

0.797

2.379
Conf(-3.892

Decision

-1.164
~ r.tD ~

Retain r.tx - r.ty

+ 0.728) =

90%

0.027

2.144

-0.976

Retain r.tx = r.ty

1.824

2.693

-0.366

Retain r.tx = r.ty

1.992

2.569

-0.146

Retain r.tx = r.ty

2.076

2.969

-0.459

Retain r.tx = r.ty

-3.403

0.939

a Includes mining.
No test performed owing to the small sample size.

b

TABLE 4-10
RESULTS OF NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA POST-MERGER PAYROLL
T TESTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS

Test Group
All AcquiTed Firms
(n= 35)
Type (Acquired Firm)
Horizontal and Vertical
(11=20)
Conglomerate
(11= 15)
Broad Ind'ustTy
Manufacturing'
(n = II)
Trade
(n = 16)
Services b
(n= 8)

X

Y

6.641

7.330

Conf(-3.936 ~ r.tD

~

Retain r.tx = r.ty

+ 2.558) =

90%

5.507

7.262

-0.760

Retain r.tx = r.ty

8.152

7.419

0.233

Retain r.tx = r.ty

7.059

8.009

-0.221

Retain r.tx = r.ty

7.882

7.Il2

0.326

Retain r.tx = r.ty

3.583

6.784

a Includes mining.
No test performed owing to the small sample size.

b

Decision
-0.361
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AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL EFFECTS OF THE NEBRASKA·
OUTSTATE ACQUISITIONS

The matched-pair tests on the Nebraska-Outstate data indicated
that mergers of this type adversely affected the employment and
payroll growth rates of the acquired firms. The magnitude of the
resulting negative impacts, however, could not be determined from
the growth rates alone. The aggregate employment and payroll
losses depended upon the sizes of the firms at the time of their
acq uisi tions.
In order to estimate these losses, each firm's employment and
payroll at the time of acquisition was projected to 1970 figures by
assuming the firm's employment and payroll would have grown at
rates equal to the average firm in its industry. * The projected 1970
values were then compared with the actual 1970 ones. The difference between the aggregated projected values and the actual 1970
values constituted the aggregate 1970 impact of the 51 mergers,
1964-1968.
This methodology was utilized since the pre-merger employment and payroll growth rates of the acquired firms were not significantly different from those of the hypothetical average firms in their
2-digit industries. t Hence, in the absence of the mergers, one would
expect that approximately one-half of the firms would have grown
faster than their industry averages; another one-half, slower. If the
51 mergers had not occurred, therefore, the actual aggregate 1970
employment and payroll of the 51 firms would have been approximately equal to the aggregate values based upon the industry average rates. Table 4-11 summarizes the estimated 1970 aggregate impacts of the 51 mergers which occurred during the 1964-1968 period.
The 51 acquisitions of Nebraska firms by out-of-state corporations resulted in an estimated net 1970 employment loss of 1,762
and a net 4th quarter payroll loss of $2,959,234. The total 1970
payroll loss, therefore, would be approximately four times this
value, $11,836,936.
,. If the firm was acquired in 1967, for example, then the "appropriate"
industry growth rate was computed using 1966 through 1970 industry average
data. The following formula was used to calculate the projected 1970 figures:
Y = X(l + r)n where,·
Y = projected 1970 value, X = value at time of acquisition, r average annual
growth rate of hypothetical industry average firm, and n = number of years
between values X and Y.
t In fact, the average pre·merger payroll growth rate of the acquired firms
exceeded that of the hypothetical match firms, 6.958 percent to 4.929 percent.
The estimated aggregate impact, therefore, is a conservative one.

=
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Several points regarding this loss need to be underscored. First,
the estimated loss is for the year 1970 only. The total loss from
the mergers, including all post-merger years, would be substantially
greater. Second, only 51 of the 83 Nebraska-Outstate mergers are
included in this estimate. Also, the 83 mergers occurred in the fiveyear period 1964-1968. If all Nebraska-Outstate mergers occurring
during the entire decade were used in the estimation, the resulting
1970 figure would be greatly magnified. Third, the 1970 loss is
"re-occurring" since it will also evidence itself in 1971, 1972, and
so forth. In fact, the annual magnitude of the negative impact will
increase because of the acquired firm's negative employment and
payroll trends.
A final point deserves careful consideration. The $11,836,936
loss to the 1970 Nebraska economy was a "primary" loss. "Secondary" or multiplicative losses also resulted. A dollar reduction in
household spending in Nebraska creates secondary income losses of
approximately an additional dollar. * Hence, the total payroll impact of the 51 mergers was approximately $23,673,872. Other potential "secondary" economic impacts of the mergers are examined
in the following chapter.
TABLE 4-11
AGGREGATE

1970

IMPACTS OF

Projected
Employment
Payroll

51 NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE
1964-1968
Actual

8,359

6,597

$16,269,447

$13,310,213

ACQUISITIONS,

Net Aggregate
Impact
-1,762
-$2,959,234
(4th Quarter)

Taking all of these factors into consideration, it must be concluded that acquisitions of Nebraska firms by non-Nebraska corporations have substantially reduced employment and income within
Nebraska. This conclusion is true in the aggregate. It is not true
in each individual merger case. Some Nebraska firms have had large
annual post-merger growth rates relative to both their pre-merger
rates and to their industry average rates.

* The actual Nebraska household multiplier as indicated by Nebraska inputoutput tables is 2.12557. See Theodore W. Roesler, F. Charles Lamphear, and
M. David Beveridge, The Economic Impact of Irrigated Agriculture on the
Economy of Nebraska (Lincoln: Bureau of Business Research, University of
;'\!ebraska, 1968), Appendix.
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EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL EFFECTS

Several possible explanations for the observed employment and
payroll effects associated with the N ebraska-Outstate acquisitions
require examination. One such explanation involves an application
of the merger-efficiency contention.
Greater economic efficiency may have resulted in a reduction of
employment and consequently payroll in either of two ways. First,
the acquired firms may have employed inefficiently large work forces
prior to their acquisitions. That is, many employees may have had
overlapping functions. Upon acquisition, the local operations may
have become more efficient by eliminating specific jobs and reorganizing and combining others. The net result would be slow
or negative annual post-merger employment and payroll growth
rates.
A second "efficiency" explanation may be offered. Prior to the
acquisitions, the acquired firms may have had low capital-labor
ratios. Once acquired, however, the access to new capital sources
may have allowed the firms to obtain more efficient capital-labor
mixes. Post-merger growth may have taken the form of capital
expansion, rather than employment and payroll growth. *
Both of the "efficiency" explanations, however, appear to be
tenuous at best. Little evidence exists to suggest that, on the average,
acquired firms are inefficient firms and that most mergers are accompanied by economies. In fact, as noted in Chapter III, the bulk of
the existing evidence appears to indicate that acquired firms are
usually profitable enterprises and that few genuine economies result
from corporate acquisitions. While some overlapping functions
between the acquired and acquiring units may have existed, it is
extremely doubtful that the resulting employment and payroll
effects would be of the magnitudes indicated by the Nebraska postmerger rates.
Furthermore, the addition of new capital may just as likely
expand employment and payroll as reduce it. New investments in
plant and equipment usually entail "output effects" as well as "substitution effects." These "output effects" would serve to increase
employment and thereby mitigate any reductions resulting from
the substitution of capital for labor. Owing to the reasons cited
above, the "efficiency" interpretations are deemed to be unsatisfactory explanations of the adverse Nebraska merger impact.
* Asset size data on the firms were not available. These data, of coursc, would
allow onc to test the capital-labor hypothesis.
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A second potential explanation of the Nebraska results is that
the acquisitioCls, in general, may have proved to be unprofitable.
The acquirin~' firms, often conglomerates, may have misjudged the
potential prolitability of their acquisitions. Upon finding themselves in financial difficulties, the conglomerate firms may have
ordered cutbacks in operations at their smaller units in order to
free funds to continue operating large units at full capacity. Nebraska employment and payroll may have suffered as a result of
the inability of the conglomerates to sustain overall economic
profits.
Although a reasonable interpretation, this explanation does not
appear to be sufficiently general to serve as an adequate explanation
for the overall Nebraska results. This explanation is probably descriptive in some of the individual Nebraska cases, but the on-going
nature of the conglomerate merger movement casts doubt upon
the general proposition that acquisition strategies prove to be
financially self-defeating.
A third potential interpretation of the Nebraska-Outstate merger
results is that the Nebraska acquisitions were accompanied by
transfers of personnel from Nebraska. This explanation appears to
be limited to specific mergers and relatively small numbers of
employees. Although transfer did occur, * it does not seem probable
that they were of a sufficient magnitude to serve as more than a
partial explanation of the Nebraska results.
A fourth explanation may be cited. The Nebraska-acquired firms
may have been acquired for reasons other than their potential
profitability. Some acquisitions may have involved attempts to
"purchase" patent rights, trade secrets, innovative management, and
so forth. Once these were obtained, the continued growth of the
local firm may have been of little consequence to the acquirer. In
some instances, the acquisition may have been an attempt to acquire
a new market area through the elimination of local competition.
If this were the case, local employment and payrolls might be
adversely affected.
A final interpertation of the observed Nebraska impact may be
termed a "transposed-growth-strategy" explanation. It was hypothesized in Chapter III that corporations with external growth policies tend to be constrained, size-maximizing companies while nonacquiring firms usually have traditional profit-maximizing motives.
,. In the questionnaire sent to executives of acquired Nebraska firms, over
50 percent of the respondents indicated that there had been transfers of upper
management personnel as a result of their mergers.
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The non-Nebraska acquiring firms, most of which were conglomerates, obviously were pursuing external growth strategies.
Being typical profit-maximizing firms, however, the Nebraska acquirees were undoubtably seeking growth through internal expansion. The fact that their pre-merger rates of employment and payroll were typical of those of other Nebraska businesses tends to su pport this contention. But what occurred to the internal-growth
strategies of the Nebraska firms upon acquisition? The externalgrowth, size-maximizing policies of the acquiring firms were transposed upon the local firms. That is, the Nebraska firms became a
part of organizations with different growth philosophies. These
new strategies were responsible for the stagnation in local employment and payroll growth. Large proportions of the available investment capital of the parent corporations may have been devoted to
further external expansion, rather than to internal expansion of
the operations of the many subdivisions.
This explanation may also show why no adverse impacts were
associated with the Nebraska-Nebraska mergers. Most of these acquisitions were of the horizontal and vertical variety and involved
small localized firms. It is doubtful, therefore, that the acquiring
firms were pursuing a basic external growth policy. The acquisitions
were likely prompted by expediency and not by a general desire to
maximize size. As a result, transpositions of growth strategies did
not occur upon acquisition. Rather, the merged firms continued to
pursue internal expansion just as they had prior to the mergers.
Thus, the "transposed growth strategy" hypothesis is sufficiently
general as to be tenable with respect to the overall Nebraska
results. This interpretation certainly deserves additional research
exploration.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Nebraska firms acquired by out-of-state corporations, experienced average annual pre-merger employment and payroll growth
rates similar to other average Nebraska firms. In the post-merger
periods, however, these rates declined sharply and were significantly
smaller than those of average Nebraska firms. The aggregate adverse
impact of the Nebraska-Outstate mergers was substantial. The
"direct" 1970 loss resulting from 51 mergers alone was nearly $12
million. Several explanations of the adverse economic employment
and payroll effects may be advanced, but the "transposed-growthstrategy" interpretation appears to be the most tenable general
explanation.
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The Nebraska-Nebraska mergers differed remarkably from the
Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions. Firms acquired by other Nebraska
companies were relatively slow-growing concerns in slowly expanding industries. The analysis of the post-merger records of the
merged firms indicated that no adverse Nebraska employment and
payroll effects resulted from these acquisitions.

v/

The Outflow of Corporate Control and

Decision-Making: Possible Economic Consequences

An additional salient effect accompanying corporate mergers
involving Nebraska firms is a geographical shift of corporate control and decision-making. * In a net sense, Nebraska clearly has
not fared well in this regard. This is to suggest that during the
period under study, 1964-1968, a substantially greater number of
Nebraska firms were acquired by corporations residing outside of
the state than vice versa.
During the five-year period, 83 Nebraska firms were acquired
by outstate concerns. Also, it should be recalled from Chapter II
that the majority of these firms were large relative to the averagesized firm within their 2-digit industry. During the last two years
of the period, 1967 and 1968, 49 Nebraska firms were purchased.
During these same two years, only 14 out-of-state corporations were
acquired by Nebraska-based firms. Only six Nebraska corporations
were found to be actively engaged in an acquisition program which
involved one or more non-Nebraska corporations. t Thus the years
1967 and 1968 witnessed a net outflow of corporate control on a
3.5:1 basis.
THE LOCATIONS OF NEBRASKA FIRMS ACQUIRED BY
NON-NEBRASKA CORPORATIONS

Table 5-1 indicates the location of the Nebraska firms which
were acquired by non-Nebraska corporations during the period,
1964-1968. Of 83 such firms, 45, or 54.2 percent, were located in
Omaha, 8, or 9.6 percent, in Lincoln; and 4 in Grand Island. Thus
over two-thirds of all the firms acquired by outstate corporations
were located in one of Nebraska's three largest cities.
The predominance of Omaha acquisitions is particularly obvious
in the 1968 merger data. Nineteen of the 28 mergers occurring dur.. Corporate control may be defined as "decision-making authority with respect to corporate assets." It is assumed that this control resides with management rather than ,,-ith stockholders.
t See the Appendix_
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5-1

TABLE

NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE ACQUISITIONS BY LOCATION OF THE

1964-1968

ACQUIRED FIRM,

Location of
Acquired Firm
Omaha
Lincoln
Grand Island
Fremont
Hastings
Scottsbluff
Other
Total

1964
7

1965
2
2
I
I

I
9

3
9

1966

1967

1968

Total

7

10

I
I

I
I
I
1

19
4

5
16

1
6
21

45
8
4
4
3
2
17
83

2

I
I
I

2
28

ing this year involved Omaha firms. Omaha, of course, is Nebraska's
largest city with a population over twice as large as its nearest rival,
Lincoln. If the relative frequency of mergers is computed on a per
capita basis, however, Omaha ranks third in merger activity among
the five largest Nebraska cities. This relationship is shown in
Figure 5-1.
Fremont, with .179 mergers per 1,000 people, showed the highest
relative frequency of Nebraska-Outstate mergers, 1964-1968, among
the five largest Nebraska cities. Grand Island was second with nearly
.14 mergers per 1,000 population. Lincoln had relatively few
mergers as measured on the per capita basis. A small number of
mergers per capita need not indicate a small relative impact, however. The relative local impact of the mergers will depend upon
the sizes of the acquired firms.
The column marked "Other" in Table 5-1 should be noted.
Seventeen acquisitions, each occurring in a separate community,
are represented in this category. The population of the 13 smallest
of these communities ranged from 5,226 to 626, with an average
population of 1,926. In each of the thirteen cases, therefore, acquisitions per capita exceeded that of Fremont. In absolute size, the
majority of these firms were extremely small. In three of the 13
cases, however, the firms which were acquired had approximately
50 employees each. In their respective communities, one of which
had a population of 626 and another 749, the acquisitions resulted
in significant relative losses of local corporate control.
THE LOCATIONS OF THE ACQUIRING NON-NEBRASKA CORPORATIONS

Table 5-2 indicates the regional locations of the outstate firms
which acquired Nebraska firms, 1964-1968.* Thirty-four of the

* For

a complete classification of acquiring firms by state, see the Appendix.
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FIGURE 5-1
NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE ACQUISITIONS PER
BY CITY,

1,000

RESIDENTS,

1964-1968
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acquiring corporations, nearly 41 percent, resided in states adjacent
to Nebraska. Twelve of these 34 firms were headquartered in Minnesota and 9 in Iowa. Kansas and Missouri firms each undertook five
acquisitions. All but one of the Minnesota acquirers resided in
Minneapolis-St. Paul, and a majority of the Iowa purchasers headquartered in Des Moines.
Nearly 50 percent of the non-Nebraska acquirers resided in
either the Northeast or Mideast regions of the United States.
Twenty-two corporations were from the former region; 18 from the
latter. New York dominated the "Northeast" category with 10
acquiring firms; Illinois topped the Mideast region with II. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Ohio each headquartered four acquiring firms.
As indicated in Figure 5-2, over 50 percent of the outflow of
corporate control resulting from the Nebraska acquisitions ended
up in just four states: Minnesota, Illinois, New York, and Iowa.
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TABLE

5-2

N EBRASKA-OUTSTATE MERGERS BY REGION OF THE ACQUIRI:-IG FIRM,

1964-1968
Region of Acquiring
Corporation

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

Total

Neighboring States
(Minnesota, Iowa,
Kansas, Missouri,
South Dakota,
Colorado)

2

5

7

9

11

34

Northeast
(New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania,
:'\lew Jersey,
Maryland)

4

2

5

10

22

iHideast
(Illinois, Ohio,
Michigan, Indiana)
atheT Regions
Total

2

2

4

6

5

19

1
9

9

4
16

21

2
28

8
83

THE DIRECTIONAL FLOW OF CORPORATE CONTROL RESULTING FROM
NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE ACQUISITIONS

It is clear from Table 5-2 and Figure 5-2 that the outfiow of
corporate control from Nebraska has been multi-directional. A
common thread runs through the data, however. In the great majority of instances, corporate control Howed into a state with a
larger population than that of Nebraska. Furthermore, two of the
regions of the United States in which a large portion of all corporate control resided, the Northeast and Mideast, gained additional decision-making authority at the expense of a state which
had relatively little such control. *
This pattern seems to involve most of the Midwest region, in
general. As evident from Table 5-3, the states of Nebraska, Iowa,
South Dakota, Kansas, Colorado, Wyoming, and North Dakota had
a combined net loss of corporate control of 334 manufacturing corporations during the 1955-1968 period. This does not include the
loss of control resulting from acquisitions of trade, finance, and
service firms. If these industries were included, the net loss figure
* for example, New York, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Illinois headquartered 77.2 percent of the combined assets of the 200 largest manufacturing
corporations in 1968. The 200 largest corporations in the United States control
oYer 60 percent of all the manufacturing assets in the nation.

Outflow of Cont101

65

/

FIGURE 5-2
NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE ACQUISITIONS BY STATE OF THE ACQUIRING FIR:\1,
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
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might be twice as large.* New York gained the largest amount of
corporate control during this period. It showed a net gain of 1,732.
Illinois was second with a gain of 484.
Not only did the direction of Nebraska corporate control flow
toward larger industrial states, it also tended to flow toward larger
urban areas. This is clearly shown in Figure 5-3.
" The author bases this estimate on the findings of Chapter II. There it was
shown that more Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions involved firms engaged in
trade, finance, and services than in manufacturing, 1964-1968.
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TABLE

5-3

NET LOSSES OF CORPORATE CONTROL IN MANUFACTURING,

State
Colorado
Iowa
Kansas
Nebraska
North Dakota
South Dakota
Wyoming
New York
Illinois

Companies Acquired
by:Firms
Outside State

I

187
1I0

121
70
7

13
16
1,346
910

1955-1968

Outstate Finns
Acquired by
State Companies

Net
Loss

55

-132

42
32

-68
-89

54
I
1

5
3,078
1,829

-16
-6
-12
-II

+1,732
+484

SOL'RCE: Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission.

In 59 of the 83 instances in which non-Nebraska corporations
acquired Nebraska firms, corporate control flowed to a larger
metropolitan area. In other words, the metropolitan area of the
acquiring firm had a greater population than the metropolitan
area of the acquired Nebraska firm. In 44, or 75 percent of these 59
instances, the population of the metropolitan area of the acquiring
corporation exceeded one million. It is thus clear that corporate
acquisitions of Nebraska firms have served to shift corporate control
toward states which headquarter substantial numbers of corporations and, in particular, to concentrate that control in large urban
centers.
Nebraska's largest city, Omaha, has been a net loser of corporate
control as have smaller Nebraska communities. Though Omaha
firms, for example, acquired 13 non-Nebraska-based corporations
in 1967-1968, out-of-state corporations acquired 29 Omaha firms
during this same period.
The outflow of corporate control from Nebraska and from other
relatively sparsely populated Midwestern states could have serious
economic, social, and political implications. These implications
will be discussed later in this chapter.
THE DIRECTIONAL FLOW OF BUSINESS CONTROL RESULTING FROM
NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA ACQUISITIONS

An examination of the Nebraska-Nebraska acquisitions on the
basis of the locations of the acquiring and acquired firms revealed
that a net flow of corporate control toward larger communities was
generated. Though directionally the same as the Nebraska-Outstate
mergers, the loss of corporate control to larger communities was
much less pronounced. Of the 66 acquisitions of Nebraska firms by
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FIGURE 5-3
THE PERCENTAGE OF INSTANCES IN WHICH NEBRASKA CONTROL
FLOWED TO LARGER METROPOLITAN AREAS AND AREAS WITH
POPULATIONS OVER ONE MILLION
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other Nebraska companies, 26 involved cases in which the community of the acquiring firm was larger than that of the acquiree.
On the other hand, 13 mergers involved situations in which the
acquiring firm was located in a smaller community than the community headquartering the acquired firm. In 27 of the 66 mergers,
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40.9 percent, the firms were either located in the same community
or else their respective communities were of approximately equal
size. Thus of the 39 acquisitions which involved two unequal-sized
communities, 66.7 percent resulted in a loss of corporate control for
the smaller city or village.
It should be remembered that the Nebraska-Nebraska mergers
generally involved the acquisition of small firms. However, the
local loss of control of a firm in a small town may be significant in
a relative sense, regardless of the actual size of the company which
was purchased.
In 17 of the 26 instances in which business control flowed to a
larger city, Omaha, Lincoln, or Grand Island was the recipient.
Just as acquisitions of Nebraska firms by non-Nebraska corporations
have led to a greater geographical concentration of corporate control in the U.S., the Nebraska-Nebraska mergers have resulted in a
greater concentration of business control within Nebraska. The
trend within Nebraska, however, has not been nearly as pronounced
as the trend associated with the purchase of Nebraska firms by corporations residing in other states.
hiPLICATIONS OF THE OUTFLOW OF CORPORATE CONTROL:
POPULATION DISPERSION

The economic, sociological, and political effects associated with
the shift of corporate control from smaller to larger communities
are potentially of great significance. That portion of the merger
movement in Nebraska which had involved only Nebraska firms
has served to concentrate business control within the state. The
portion which has involved purchases of Nebraska firms by nonNebraska corporations has served to drain corporate decisionmaking power from Nebraska.
In the case of Nebraska-Outstate mergers, vital economic decisions which may greatly affect local Nebraska communities are
increasingly being made from distant headquarters. This is not to
suggest that the management of locally acquired firms relinquish
all corporate decision-making authority upon acquisition. Obviously,
day-to-day decisions continue to be made at the local level. The
fact remains, however, that most major decisions, those which are
most likely to affect the community vitally, will subsequently be
determined in some other city. In the case of the Nebraska-Outstate
acquisitions, this city is likely to be New York, Chicago, Minneapolis, or some similar urban area. In a sense, the Nebraska
community loses a portion of the economic control of its own
destiny. In light of the research findings stated in Chapter IV,
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there is reason to suspect that this loss of economic decision-making
authority, on the average, may be accompanied by adverse local
economic repercussions.
Though it does not appear that Nebraska-Nebraska mergers
have been accompanied by adverse employment and payroll effects,
other adverse local impacts may have accompanied these acquisitions. For example, many of the mergers may have resulted in
shifts in sources of supply and the abandonment of the use of local
financial institutions. Thus, the flow of corporate control generated
by the Nebraska-Nebraska mergers, as with the outstate acquisitions,
may have served to affect adversely the communities of the acquired
firms.
The author's concern with the loss of corporate control from
states and communities which possess relatively little such control,
and the subsequent concentration of corporate decision making,
goes far beyond a simple desire to preserve small enterprises. This
matter needs further explanation.
First, remember that the major motives underlying the current
merger movement are largely financial. Mergers which involve true
economies, economies which will ultimately find their way back to
consumers in the form of lower prices, are certainly justifiable.
However, even "efficiency" itself is subject to broader constraints.
If the end result is undesirable, then to do something efficiently is
to compound that undesirability. But that is another issue. Fortunately, we are on safe grounds, particularly in analyzing the Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions, to assume that few true economies
were involved. This is the case since these mergers were predominantly of the conglomerate type. Therefore, one may look directly
at the negative effects of the acquisitions.
A new and rapidly emerging concern in the United States is
the lack of dispersion of population within the nation. The tremendous flow of people from sparsely populated areas to bulging
urban areas has given rise to tremendous economic and social problems. One need only remind the reader of air and water pollution,
traffic congestion, urban blight, and poverty to reinforce the contention that the social costs associated with our urban environment
have tended partially to mitigate the economies resulting from a
highly concentrated population.
The need to reverse the population flow from our metropolitan
areas has been widely recognized and cogently stated both by leaders within the current Nixon administration and by those in the
Democratic Party. These political pronouncements and actions are
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actually responses to the realization that human well-being cannot
be directly equated to the level of the Gross National Product.
External effects and their attendant cost transfers serve to raise the
possibility that a private decision may be accompanied by social
costs.
But how does this discussion concern itself with the outflow of
corporate control from local communities? The answer, of course,
is that population dispersion requires viable smaller communities.
The reversal of the historical flow of people toward metropolitan
areas requires expanding employment opportunities within smaller,
more geographically dispersed cities and villages. Furthermore, if
these smaller communities are to remain attractive places in which
to reside, they must possess certain degrees of economic control
over their own futures. The current merger movement, in effect, is
abetting perverse locational effects. The removal of corporate control from local communities serves to dilute the viability of the
smaller city while concentrating control in urban population
centers.
Samuel R. Reid, expressing a similar concern, stated:
The loss of corporate headquarters can have a major effect
upon the quality of life in the smaller communities which
may add to the exodus to larger metropolitan areas which
are already experiencing numerous problems. \l\Thile production facilities may remain in the smaller communities, the
executives (and those associated with their paperwork) usually are transferred to major urban centers with growing
white collar office complexes. 1
It was concluded in Chapter IV that corporate acqUISItIOns
which have involved non-Nebraska acquirers have had adverse
employment and payroll effects, on the average, within the localities of the acquired firms. This is but one aspect of the outflow of
corporate control. Some other potentialities require examination.

REDUCTIONS IN COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

A direct economic and social impact which may result from a
corporate acquisition is a reduction in community involvement.
New management may replace old, and this new management may
not possess the same degree of community pride and participation.
It takes time to gain a community spirit, of course, and "a manager
who is moved every two or three years becomes company oriented
rather than community oriented."2
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It has been suggested that executives of local-based corporations
are more likely, on the average, to give of their time to community
causes than are newly established executives of non-Nebraska based
companies. For example, when corporations were asked to contribute ten weeks of key executive time for Nebraska's Little Hoover
Commission, 42 executives responded favorably. Thirty-seven of
those who undertook the research were from Omaha- or Lincolnbased firms, three were retired, and only two were affiliated with
Nebraska firms which had out-of-state headquarters. a
The 'Visconsin merger study sought to test empirically the hypothesis that corporate acquisitions of local firms tends to reduce
community involvement. 4 United Fund contributions were utilized
as a proxy. The Wisconsin results were extremely mixed. Some firms
became generous contributors upon acquisition, others sharply reduced their contributions.
The contributions of 30 acquired Milwaukee firms were compared with those of an equal number of firms which were not
involved in acquisitions. Indices measuring the growth of contributions and the average contribution per employee were calculated.
The results of the research were less than conclusive. Acquired firms
increased their contributions about 16 percent during the years
1958-1968; firms which were not acquired, almost 34 percent. However, the study also discovered that the subsequently acquired firms
had a smaller average pre-merger percentage increase than did the
non-merging corporations during the same years.
The "\Visconsin study concluded: "The only major conclusion
to be reached is that United Fund contributions in Milwaukee apparently have been adversely affected by out-of-state acquisitions
because of decreased rates of growth following the merger of several Milwaukee companies.""
Much additional research is required in this area. The loss of
local corporate control mayor may not be accompanied by a general
reduction in community participation. In the light of adverse employment and payroll effects suggested in Chapter IV, however, it is
certainly doubtful that, on the average, total community contributions will increase as a result of an acquisition. Whether there is a
likelihood that this involvement will be reduced requires further
research.
PLANT SHUTDOWNS

A particularly adverse economic impact has accompanied some
acquisitions. Sometimes they have been followed by a complete
plant shutdown. The acquiring firm may purchase a local con-

72

/

Local Impacts of Mergers

cern in order to secure patent rights or to secure technological
know-how. The real property of the acquired finn may thus be of
secondary importance. Once the acquisition has taken place, therefore, the local operation may be in jeopardy. The Nebraska experience, 1964-1968, witnessed at least three cases in which local operations were terminated within a few years after the acquisition. The
exact reasons for these terminations were not discovered. The acquiring firm simply may have found that it had made a poor purchase. However, the pre-merger employment and payroll data on
the firms does not indicate that they were "dying businesses" prior
to their acquisitions.
ADVERSE EFFECTS RESULTING FROM CHANGES IN SOURCES OF
RAW MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES

The outflow of business control may have multiplicative economic impacts within the community of the acquired firm. One of
these potential economic effects is a shift in sources of raw materials
and general supplies. In those instances in which the acquisition is
accompanied by centralized purchasing, local suppliers who previously held accounts with the local firm will sufler. Such effects
tend to multiply themselves through the community and thereby
serve to decrease employment opportunities and income within
the locality.
Of course, the local loss is someone else's gain. The new source
of supply, however, is likely to be located in or near the urban
area in which the acquirer resides. * Thus the secondary effects of
the business acquisition tend to propel the movement of corporate
control and population toward metropolitan areas. With this movement come the attendant social costs.
It should be remembered that few, if any, substantial true
economies are likely to result from mergers, particularly those of the
conglomerate type. Thus the shift to centralized purchasing is
usually a matter of managerial expediency. In many instances, however, the monopsonistic purchasing power of the parent corporation
may result in some cost saving for the local firm. But even when this
is the case, the resulting resource allocation may be less desirable
than it was previously. This is to suggest that private efficiency need
not correspond to a socially efficient allocation of resources. The
external diseconomies generated by the accompanying population
" This may not be true in all cases, however. If the raw matcl'ials are bulky
and therefore incur high transportation costs, the new source of supply will
likel y be gcographically close to the acquired firm.

Outflow of Control

/

73

shift may far outweigh the private advantages associated with the
more efficient purchasing of supplies.
Economists have long realized that private efficiency may be
accompanied by social cost. In the above case, these costs may exceed
the resource allocation benefits; and as a result, a move which
seemingly would be "efficient" is not socially efficient owing to the
external diseconomies involved. Thus a socially efficient resource
allocation, one which considers external effects, may require modification of private business actions.
TABLE 5-4
RESULTS OF THE NEBRASKA SURVEY OF ACQUIRED FIRMS) CHANGES IN
SOURCE OF SUPPLY

Question: Does your firm utilize the same suppliers of raw materials and general supplies that it did pre-merger or docs it now rely on centralized
purchasing by the parent company?
Responses

II Nebraska-Outstate II Nebraska-Nebraska I

No Change
Centralized Purchasing
Both
Total

Total

17
10
4

11
8

28

31

19

50

18
4

Table 5-4 displays the results of the Nebraska merger survey
with respect to changes in sources of supply. Of the 50 participants
in the survey, 31 were executives of firms acquired by non-:\'ebraska
corporations; 19 were executives of firms acquired by other Nebraska firms. *
In both the Nebraska-Outstate and Nebraska-Nebraska cases,
the majority of the acquired firms witnessed no change in their
sources of supplies. However, in approximately 45 percent of the
outstate acquisitions and 42 percent of the instate mergers, changes
did occur. This is particularly significant in the Nebraska-Outstate
case since it is likely that the use of centralized purchasing resulted
in a substantial loss to Nebraska business. The 10 firms which
switched to centralized purchasing included several which would be
considered relatively large Nebraska firms. Hence, these shifts in
sources of supply probably entailed large dollar losses of business
to their previous suppliers. It should be pointed out, however, that
in many instances the original source of supply may have been outstate before the merger.
* To the extent that some executives might not wish to indicate local
effects, the survey may contain a bias. If such a bias is involved, the results
actually understate the adverse local impacts.
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It is difficult to assess the actual economic impact resulting from
changes in sources of supply. Suffice it to say, however, that the
possibility that such changes will accompany a merger serves to
increase the probability that adverse local economic impacts will
accompany it.

ADVERSE EFFECTS RESULTING FROM THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE PARENT
COMPANY'S FINANCIAL AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

The outflow of business control may have adverse local multiplicative effects in other ways. Upon acquisition, the acquired firm
may begin to use the banking, insurance, accounting, and other
financial institutions which are employed by the parent corporation.
It may also rely on legal services provided through the parent company rather than local services. Tables 5-5 and 5-6 indicate that
these effects were more pronounced than were changes in sources
of supply.
As may be seen in Table 5-5, in over 45 percent of the NebraskaOutstate cases surveyed, the acquired firm currently relies exclusively upon the financial institutions employed by the parent corporation. Another 29 percent currently use both local and parent
corporation financial institutions. Therefore, in the NebraskaOutstate experience, nearly 75 percent of the Nebraska firms apparently abandoned the services of some or all of their local financial
institutions. The biggest local loss was probably in the banking area.
Since many of the acquired Nebraska firms were large, their local
accounts were obviously substantial. The loss of these accounts likely
was accompanied by multiplicative adverse economic impacts within
the local community.
Inasmuch as a large majority of the acquiring firms were located
in large metropolitan areas, financial institutions within these areas
were probably the recipients of the new business. Once again, then,
it may well be that the concentration of corporate control resulting
from the Nebraska mergers served further to geographically concentrate economic activity.
Although approximately 63 percent of the Nebraska-Nebraska
acquisitions involved changes in the use of financial institutions,
the adverse local effects were likely to be much more subdued than
in the Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions. The reason this was probably true is that many of the Nebraska-Nebraska mergers involved
firms which resided in the same community. Therefore, the shift
of financial institutions which may have accompanied the acquisi-
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TABLE 5-5
RESULTS OF THE NEBRASKA SURVEY OF ACQUIRED FIRMS, CHANGES IN
THE USE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Question: Does your firm currently utilize the same financial (banking, insurance, etc.) institutions as it did before the merger or does it now
utilize those of the acquiring company?
Responses

Nebraska·
Outstate

Nebraska·
Nebraska

Same Institutions
Parent Company's Institutions
Both
Total

8

14
9
31

10
9

19

Total

18
23
9
50

tion would have no net effect locally. One local bank's loss would
simply be another local bank's gain. Furthermore, the transfer of
business control in some of the Nebraska-Nebraska mergers involved
two relatively small communities. Though the shift of financial
institutions would definitely have adverse local effects in the community of the acquired firm, the slightly larger community would
benefit. Since both of the communities were small, the perverse
population effects associated with the Nebraska-Outstate mergers
would not be of serious consequence.
Results very similar to those of the Nebraska survey were obtained in a survey of 20 Wisconsin executives whose firms had been
recently acquired. 6 The Wisconsin study found that in 70 percent
of the cases the acquired firms had shifted in whole or in part to
the financial institutions of the acquiring companies. Fifteen of
the 20 surveyed executives were associated with firms which were
acquired by non-Wisconsin corporations. The combined results of
the Nebraska and Wisconsin surveys allow one to conclude that
acquisitions are likely to be accompanied by adverse local effects
resulting from the abandonment of local financial institutions.
Table 5-6 indicates that the communities of the acquired Nebraska firms (on the average) were adversely affected in yet another
sense. Acquired firms tended to abandon the use of local legal services. Owing to the factors mentioned earlier, the Nebraska-Outstate
responses are of the most significance. Here we see that nearly 75
percent of the acquired companies currently utilize legal services
provided through their parent corporations. Seventeen of the 31
acquired firms make exclusive use of their parent's legal services;
another 7 use them to a lesser degree.
Once again the results of the Wisconsin study are in general
conformity with the Nebraska experience. In 75 percent of the Wis-
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TABLE 5-6

RESULTS OF THE NEBRASKA SURVEY OF ACQUIRED FIRMS, CHANGES IN
THE USE OF LEGAL SERVICES

Question: Does your firm currently utilize local legal services or services provided
through the parent company?
Responses
Local Services
Parent Company's Services
Both
Total

NebraskaOutstate

7
17
7
31

NebraskaNebraska
6

12
1

-

19

Total

13
29
8

50

consin cases surveyed, the acquiring firm's legal services were used
in whole or in part.
It is likely that the larger acquiring corporations possessed their
own legal departments. Upon acquisition the services of these departments became available to the local firms. Where duplication of
legal personnel was involved, some true economies may have resulted. However, when the acquired firm was relatively large, the
parent corporation was likely to need to expand its legal staff to
serve the additional corporate entity. The expansion of employment
opportunities in the locality of the parent corporation would, in
effect, come at the expense of those individuals and firms which had
previously provided the legal services for the acquired firm.
Since the acquiring firms tended to be located in larger metropolitan areas, the shifts in the use of legal services tended to promulgate the flow of population toward metropolitan areas. The loss
of local corporate control has thus been shown once again to serve
to undermine the economic viability of the smaller city or locality.
These adverse effects-changes in sources of supply and shifts in
the utilization of financial and legal services-are multiplicative.
The total impact on the local community will exceed the simple
dollar expenditure loss. This is due to the fact that such dollars
would have been respent within the community. Thus, for example,
the dollar loss to the local legal firm may be felt in part by the local
car dealer, clothing store, and so on.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Nebraska merger experience, 1964-1968, reveals several geographic trends with respect to corporate control. The NebraskaOutstate mergers have resulted in marked shifts of corporate control from smaller to larger cities. A majority of the acquiring firms
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resided in metropolitan areas of over one million residents. The
outflow of corporate control from Nebraska served further to concentrate it within the United States. To a lesser extent, the N ebraska-Nebraska mergers have resulted in shifts of business control
from smaller to larger Nebraska communities.
These shifts of corporate control are often accompanied by
adverse local economic effects. These effects are multiplicative. They
include shifts in sources of supply; changes in the use of banking,
accounting, and other financial services; and abandonment of the
use of local legal services.
The outflow of corporate control is a phenomenon shared by
other rural Midwestern states. The economic, sociological, and political implications of this outflow deserve careful consideration. This
is particularly true in the light of an announced policy to stem the
migration of population toward the urban areas.
The author's concern in this area is a shared one. In fact, the
wide dispersion of the control of American enterprise was a primary
concern of the authors of the Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act of
1950. Senator Kefauver expressed this concern in Congressional
hearings on his bill when he stated:
Local economic independence cannot be preserved in
the face of consolidations such as we have had during the
past few years. The control of American business is steadily
being transferred from local communities to a few large
cities in which central managers decide the policies and the
fate of the far-flung enterprises they control. Millions of
people depend helplessly on their judgment. Through monopolistic mergers the people are losing the power to direct
their own economic welfare.'
In discussing the issue of shifts in corporate control resulting
from mergers, Senator Gaylord Nelson recently concluded:
My only point is that all of us should understand this
[the centralization of corporate control] to be true. Not that
there is something intrinsically evil about it. Maybe it is a
more prudent decision when it is made in New York for a
community in Wichita than when Wichita men made it. I
think you would get a lot of static if you made the suggestion
in Wichita. But it is a fact of life ... and if the trend continues at the rate indicated here, we had better understand
fully the implications. s

VI/Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

SUMMARY OF BASIC FINDINGS

The Nebraska merger experience, 1964-1968, closely paralleled
the national merger movement. Both movements displayed a sharp
upturn during the last two years of the period. Eighty-two of the
149 acquisitions of Nebraska firms, 1964-1968, occurred in 1967 and
1968. In both the national and Nebraska cases, the current movement has become basically conglomerate. Nearly 70 percent of the
acquisitions of Nebraska firms by out-of-state corporations were of
this type. The recent Nebraska movement also paralleled the national one in that it involved firms in trade, finance, insurance, and
services, as well as in manufacturing.
The basic motives for agreeing to be acquired appeared to be
financial in nature. Several corporate tax factors have encouraged
mergers by subsidizing external expansion. Section 368 of the
Internal Revenue Code has enabled stockholders of involved firms
to avoid taxes on capital gains resulting from mergers. In addition,
since interest payments are deductible business expenses, debt
securities often have been issued and exchanged for the common
stock of an acquired corporation. Thus, the shareholders of the
acquired company are paid interest rather than dividends and the
net income from the acquired unit is increased substantially. Tax
loss credits and investment credits also have encouraged mergers.
Corporations with high tax-loss carryovers and/or investment tax
credits have a financial incentive to find merger partners with
sufficient income against which these tax advantages may be charged.
Mergers have been encouraged by certain accounting and stock
market factors. Both the pooling of interest and purchase accounting
methods of recording mergers have allowed corporations to suppress
costs and thereby inflate apparent earnings. Also, instantaneous
gains in earnings per share are achieved whenever the price-earnings ratio of the acquired firms is less than that of the acquiring
company. Since the stock market has historically rewarded increases
in earnings per share regardless of how they were achieved, external
growth firms benefit unduly.

78

Conclusions and Recommendations

/

79

In some cases, mergers are accompanied by economies of scale.
This does not appear to be the case in most instances, however.
Conglomerate mergers, by their very nature, preclude most types
of potential economies. The growth of conglomerate mergers may
be the result of the adaption of con trained size maximization motives by many large corporations. The managers of these firms find
that they may expand their corporation's asset size, sales, and revenues through acquisitions, and, thereby, maximize their own financial and psychological rewards. The financial advantages accruing
from the tax, accounting, and stock market biases enable these
firms to continue providing satisficing rates of return to stockholders.
An in-depth examination of the pre- and post-merger growth
rates of the Nebraska firms acquired by out-of-state corporations
leads one to the conclusion that these mergers have adversely
affected employment and payroll in Nebraska. The Nebraska-Outstate acquired firms were found to be growing at an average annual
pre-merger employment and payroll rate approximately equal to
those of average firms in their respective 2-digit industries. In the
post-merger period, this was not the case. The average post-merger
employment and payroll rates of the acquired firms were negative
and were significantly smaller than the mean industry average rates.
The aggregate adverse employment and payroll effects of these
mergers were substantial. On the other hand, no apparent negative
employment and payroll effects resulted from the mergers in which
one Nebraska enterprise purchased another.
Although several potential explanations for the adverse impacts
of the Nebraska-Outstate mergers may be offered, a "transposedgrowth-strategy" interpretation appears to be the most satisfactory.
The external-growth philosophies of the acquiring firms may have
been transposed upon the theretofore internal-growth strategies of
the acquired firms. Under the domination of the external-growth
strategies, internal expansion of the individual units may have been
sacrificed for continued growth via acquisition. This interpretation,
of course, is consistent with the constrained size maximization
hypothesis.
An additional adverse impact of the Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions was the resulting outflow of corporate control and decisionmaking authority from Nebraska. In over 70 percent of the acquisitions, corporate control flowed to a larger metropolitan area. Firms
located in New York, Illinois, Iowa, and Minnesota accounted for
over 50 percent of the Nebraska acquisitions, 1964-1968.
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The net outflow of corporate control from Nebraska was a
phenomenon shared by other Midwestern states. During 1955-1968,
the states of Nebraska, Iowa, South Dakota, North Dakota, Kansas,
Colorado, and 'l\Tyoming experienced a combined net outflow of
corporate control of 334 manufacturing concerns. 1£ other types of
enterprises were included, this figure would be at least twice as
large. The loss of corporate control by sparsely populated states
serves to undermine the economic viability of these states and serves
further to concentrate both decision-making and population.
The Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions adversely affected Nebraska
employment and income in "indirect" as well as in "direct" fashions. In a survey of executives of acquired firms, approximately 45
percent of the respondents indicated that their companies, either
in whole or in part, switched to centralized purchasing upon acquisition. :\'early 75 percent of the respondents indicated that their
Nebraska firms abandoned the services of some, or all, of their local
financial institutions. Likewise, over 77 percent of the executives
stated that their firms currently use legal services provided through
their parent corporations.
LWPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS

Although the economic slowdown during 1970 and 1971 has
served to retard the advance of the merger wave, most observers
feel that the current merger movement will regain its unprecedented
momentum once full economic recovery occurs. Hence, it appears
that the merger problem will remain for some time. To the extent
that the Nebraska experience is representative of the experience
of acquired firms in other states, this trend may pose a threat to
the economic vitality and viability of small- and medium-sized communities. In Nebraska, corporate acquisitions have adversely
affected employment and income within the communities of the
acquired firms. The loss of employment opportunities in rural states
such as Nebraska is of national importance. The rural to urban
exodus is well documented. If the rates of growth of employment
opportunities in the larger cities in rural America are not sufficient to handle this exodus, there is little hope of obtaining the
expressed national goal of reversing the flow of population from
less-populated states to densely-populated metropolitan areas. The
social costs of the merger movement may far outweigh the private
and social gains derived from it.
Most economists have long desired a wide geographical dispersion of economic control. The Nebraska merger findings indicate
that this wide dispersion is threatened. The loss of decision-making
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power in states such as Nebraska has served further to concentrate
the control of American business. This concentration has important
economic and political implications.
The pre-merger data indicated that the acquired Nebraska firms
were internal-growth oriented. This did not appear to be the postmerger case. Apparently, the external-growth strategies of the parent
corporations stifled further local expansion. Thus the possibility
arises that not only employment and payrolls were adversely affected.
Annual investment in new plant and equipment also may have
declined.
Internal expansion adds to the nation's capacity to produce
goods anel services. External expansion, on the other hanel, only
changes ownership anel control of existing capacity. If internal and
external expansion compete for funds, then corporate acquisitions
clearly impede economic growth. This growth is a vital necessity in
areas where the industrial base is extremely small and where rural
migration is large.
Diversification through internal expansion promotes product
competition but this is not the case with external growth. 1 Internal
expansion results in a greater number of firms in the industries
in which the diversification occurs. Diversification via acquisition,
on the other hand, leaves the number of competitors unchanged.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The merger policy of the United States government has long
focused upon anti-competitive effects. Logically, this must remain
the primary economic concern. However additional factors, namely
local economic impacts and the growing concentration of economic
control, need to be made subordinate considerations. A systematic,
comprehensive national examination of these economic and social
impacts is required. Such an examination would provide a logical
foundation for a reformulation of U.S. merger laws.
Some mergers involve economies of scale and these should not
be discouraged. However, the potential social costs of the continuing merger wave demand a new approach to merger policy.
One possible new approach to the merger issue is the levying of
a merger tax based upon the asset sizes of the involved firms. This
tax would have a dual purpose. First, it would discourage mergers
by mitigating the financial windfalls resulting from the institutional
factors cited earlier. Second, it would provide a large source of funds
to be used for both pre- and post-merger antitrust investigations.
Currently, only a small percentage of all mergers are investigated
owing to limitations of staff and funds.

82

/

Local Impacts

at

Mergers

Under the provisions of the tax system, firms would be required
to report pending mergers as well as the exact procedure under
which the merger would be consummated. There would be a requirement that these reports be filed at least six months prior to the
time of actual takeover. This reporting would have two specific
benefits. First, a complete merger list would necessarily result. Currently no such list exists, and as a result research and investigation
are seriously hampered. Second, in selected cases pre-merger investigations might be undertaken. In view of the magnitude of the current merger movement and its potential social costs, merger tax proposals deserve careful consideration.
At the state and local level, several policies recommend themselves. First, additional research in the area of local effects of corporate mergers should be undertaken. In particular, the effects of
mergers upon annual expenditures for new plant and equipment
require attention. Also, the validity of the "transposed-growthstrategy" interpretation of the Nebraska post-merger results should
be investigated empirically. A follow-up study of the growth rates
of the acquired Nebraska firms would establish whether the fiveyear post-merger rates were the results of transitions to new operations or were indeed secular in nature.
A second recommendation is that the Nebraska Economic Development Commission take an active interest in the merger problem. Legislation requiring the reporting of all mergers or acquisitions involving Nebraska firms would be extremely beneficial. A
complete merger list is absolutely essential to further research.
The Economic Development Commission should establish committees composed of Nebraska businessmen and local and state
governmental officials to visit the new executives of recently merged
firms. These committees could welcome the new corporations to
Nebraska and encourage future internal expansion of the Nebraska
operations. These committees might include representatives of local
suppliers of raw materials and officials of local banking and other
financial institutions.
A third recommendation is directed toward potential acquirees.
In many instances mergers are undertaken without sufficient premerger investigation. Executives and stockholders of Nebraska corporations should study carefully the post-merger histories of other
firms acquired by the potential acquirer. Furthermore, the question
of potential adverse local economic effects should be raised by stockholders and management of local firms during merger negotiations.
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Finally, a greater awareness of potential adverse local consequences of the acquisitions must be brought about. The basic findings of the Nebraska merger study should receive state-wide dissemination. A re-examination of the conventional wisdom is required.
An awareness of the Nebraska findings is essential to the implementation of actions designed to reduce the adverse local impacts
of corpora te mergers.
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Appendix

APPENDIX TABLE I
SELECTED LISTING OF NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE ACQUISITION,

Year

1964
1964
1964
1964
1964
1964
1965
1965
1965
1965
1965
1966
1966
1966
1966
1966
1966

Acquirer

1964-1968:1

Acquiree

Rohm-Haas Co.
Philadelphia, Pa.
Needham Packing Co.
Sioux City, Ia.
Blaustein Industries
Baltimore, Maryland
Ra yette, Inc.
New York, N.Y.
Mobil Oil Corp.
New York, N.Y.
Gas and Chemical, Inc.
Miami, Okla.
Allied Mutual Ins. Co.
Des Moines, Ia.
Northwest Bankcorporation
Minneapolis, Minn.
Custom Farm Service, Inc.
div. of City Services
New York, N.Y.
Avco Delta Corp.
subs. of Avco Corp.
New York, N.Y.
Gamble-Robinson
Minneapolis, Minn.
Yellow-Transit Freight
Kansas City, Mo.
Beatrice Foods
Chicago, Ill.
CIBA Corporation
Summi t, N.J.
Speidel Newspapers, Inc.
Reno, Nevada
Fuqua Industries
Atlanta, Georgia
Hoover Ball and
Bearing Co.
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Grain Belt Supply Co.
Omaha
Ross Packing Co.
Omaha
KBON Radio
Omaha
Tip Top Products Co.
Omaha
Northern Natural Gas
Producing Co.
Omaha
Blu Flame Gas
Omaha
Standard Reliance
Lincoln
Center Bank
Omaha
Martson Ag·Service
Central City
Iowa Finance Co.
Omaha
Ulry Talbert Co.
Grand Island
Watson-'Vilson Trans.
Omaha
Sunglow Dairy Products
Holdrege
Gland-O·Lac Co.
Omaha
Fremont Newspapers, Inc.
Fremont
Nebraska Crib and Silo Co.
Fremont
Tractor Stilts Co.
(Tote Systems)
Beatrice

a Only 56 of the 83 Nebraska·Outstate acquisitions, 1964-1968, are listed owing to the
fact that confidential records were utilized in identifying many of the mergers. No listing
of Nebraska-Nebraska mergers is given since nearly all of these mergers were identified
through these confidential sources.

86

Appendix

/

TABLE I -Continued
Year

1966
1966
1966
1966
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967

1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1968
1968
1968

Acquirer
Lady Baltimore Foods
Kansas City, Mo.
Eli Lilly and Co.
Indianapolis, Ind.
Metz Baking Co.
Sioux City, la.
Liberty Records, Inc.
(Liberty IV A, Inc.)
Los Angeles, Cal.
Gamble-Robinson
Minneapolis, Minn.
Fidelity Bankers Life
Richmond, Va.
International Funeral
Services
Des Moines, la.
Imperial Eastman Corp.
(ITE Imperial)
Chicago, Ill.
Ruben H. Donnelley Corp.
Chicago, Ill.
Moore (Samuel) and Co.
Mantua, Ohio
Allegheny Ludlum Steel
Corp_
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Edward Hines Lumber Co.
Chicago, Ill.
Biedarman National Stores
div. of American Investment
Co.
St. Louis, Mo.
Diamond Shamrock
Cleveland, Ohio
Chesebrough Ponds, Inc.
Clinton, Conn.
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.
New Bedford, Mass.
Grain Belt Breweries
Minneapolis, Minn.
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.
New Bedford, Mass.
W. R. Grace and Co.
New York, N.Y.
Mid-Continent Bottlers
Des Moines, la.
Briggs Transportation Co.
St. Paul, Minn.
Benjamin Moore Corp.
New York, N.Y.

Acquiree
Harry Rubenstein Foods
Omaha
Corvel, Inc.
Omaha
Peter Pan Bakers, Inc.
Omaha
TDC Electronic, Inc.
Omaha
Brown Fruit Co.
Grand Island
Central National Insurance
Group
Omaha
Crosby-Kunold, Inc.
Omaha
Brunning Co.
Lincoln
Direct Mail Service, Inc.
Omaha
Couplematic, Inc.
Lyman
Ogallala Electronics
Ogallala
Nebraska Bridge Supply
and Lumber Co.
Omaha
Orchard and Wilhelm
Omaha
Clarks Products
Ralston
V.S. Brush Co.
Omaha
National Indemnity Co_
Omaha
Storz Brewing Co.
Omaha
National Fire and
Marine, Inc.
Omaha
Norfolk Grain and Feed Co.
Norfolk
Royal Crown Bottlers
Omaha
Peterson and Peterson
Grand Island
Pioneer Glass and Paint
Omaha
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TABLE I-Continued
Year

1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968

Acquirer
Minnesota Paints, Inc.
Minneapolis, Minn.
Midland National Life
Watertown, S.D.
Actronics, Inc.
'Valtham, Mass.
Dravo Corp.
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Harcourt, Brace, and
World, Inc.
;'>Jew York, N.Y.
Maremount Corp.
Chicago, Ill.
Josten's, Inc.
Owatonna, Minn.
AirKaman Corp.
Bloomfield, Conn.
Emhan Corp.
Hartford, Conn.
C. J. Patterson Co.
Kansas City, Mo.
Gucrden Industries
Louisville, Ky.
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.
New Bedford, Mass.
'Veils Fargo, Inc.
subs. of Baker Industries
Los Angeles, Cal.
Ogden Food Corp.
Toledo, Ohio
Denver Midwest Motor
Freight
Denver, Colo.
Premium Service Corp.
Minneapolis, Minn.
Sunray DX Oil Co.
Tulsa, Okla.

Acquiree
Omaha Paint and Glass
Omaha
Investors Life of Nebraska
Omaha
Glauber Valve Co.
Omaha
Hastings, Ind.
Omaha and Hastings
Nebraska Farmer Co.
Lincoln
Sidles Co., Auto Div.
Omaha
Craft Guild Products, Inc.
Omaha
Duncan Beechcraft of Omaha
Omaha
Notifier Corporation
Lincoln
House of Bauer
Chocolates, Inc.
Lincoln
Magnolia Homes Mfr. Co.
Scottsbluff
The Sun Newspapers
Omaha
Samardick Enterprises
Omaha
Hayden House, Inc.
Omaha
Lincoln Motor Freight
Lincoln
Blackstone Hotel
Omaha
Schaeffer Oil Co.
Omaha
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APPENDIX TABLE II
MERGERS INVOLVING NEBRASKA ACQUIRERS AND OUT-OF-STATE FIRMS,

1967-1968
Nebraska Acquirer
Northern Natural Gas Co.
Omaha

1967
1967
Fairmont Foods, Co.
Omaha

1967
1967
1968
1968
1968

Nebraska Consolidated Mills
Omaha,
Data Documents, Ine.
Omaha

1968
1967
1967
1968

Calandra Photo, Inc.
Omaha
Lockwood Corp.
Gering
.sOURCE: National Industrial
] ournal} Standard and POOTS.

Acquiree

IYear

1967

1967
1968
Conferences

Board

Mineral Industries, Inc.
Chicago, Ill.
Varney Chemical Corp.
Janesville, Wise.
National Poly Products
Mankato, Minn.
Kitty Clover Potato Chip Co.
Wichita, Kans.
Utotem, Inc.
Houston, Texas
Origena Pizza Crust Co.
Toronto, Onto
Taylor Biscuit Co.
(location unknown)
Alora Food Products, Ltd.
Toronto, Ont.
Birdsey Flour Mills
Macon, Ga.
Punch-card div. of Univac,
div. of Sperry Rand Corp.
Minneapolis, Minn.
General Computer Forms
(location unknown)
Williams and Marcus Co.
Primos, Pa.
Don Wright Photo Service
Rock Island, Ill.
Innes Co.
Bettendorf, Ia.
Merger

Reports}

Afoody's

Industrial
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APPENDIX TABLE III
CLASSIFICATION OF NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE ACQUIRING FIRMS BY
LOCATION,

Location of Acquiring Firm

Neighboring States
Minnesota
Iowa
Kansas
Missouri
Colorado
South Dakota
Total

Northeast
New York
Massachusetts
Pennsylvania ..
Connecticut
]';ew Jersey
Maryland
Total

1964-1968
Total

12
9
5
5
2
1

34

10
4
4
2
1
1

22

Mid-East
Illinois
Ohio
Michigan
Indiana
Kentucky

11
4
2

Total

19

Others
Oklahoma
California
Virginia
Georgia
Nevada
Total

1
1

3
2
1
1

1
8
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